Kingery: Jurisdiction in Antitrust

PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER ALIEN
CORPORATE PARENTS AND AFFILIATES IN
ANTITRUST ACTIONS: A PLEA FOR PERSPICUITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Whether an alien parent or holding company with at least one
U.S. subsidiary is subject to the jurisdiction of a federal court is a
perennial problem. Patterns of trade increasingly tend to ignore
national boundaries. The normal frictions of competition and regulation generate transnational lawsuits. Corporations trading in two
or more countries often prefer to organize subsidiaries within each
jurisdiction. A frequently litigated issue is whether the court can
bring the alien affiliates before it and provide an adequate opportunity to fully resolve legal disputes.
This Comment will consider antitrust cases in which an alien
corporate defendant owns at least one domestic subsidiary. Typically, the subsidiary distributes goods produced abroad by the parent company. The factual circumstances in which personal jurisdiction will normally be asserted are reasonably well defined. 1 However, the theoretical grounds on which jurisdiction will be upheld or
denied present a quagmire of total confusion. More than fifty years
ago Judge Benjamin Cardozo observed:
The whole problem of the relation between parent and subsidiary corporations is one that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor . . . . The logical consistency of a judicial conception will
indeed be sacrificed at times when the sacrifice is essential to the
end that some accepted public policy may be defended or upheld. 2

The purpose of this Comment is to read the entrails of judicial
conceptions which have been sacrificed for reasons of public policy.
Antitrust law provides a fertile source of cases which consider
1. See generally K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 53-75 (1958);
W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 40-114 (2d ed. 1973); E. KINTNER &
M. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER 33-68 (.974); Griffin, The Power of Host
Countries Over the Multinational: Lifting the Veil in the European Economic Community
and the United States, 6 L. & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 375 (1974); Rahl, Extraterritorial Substantive
Scope of the Antitrust Laws of the United States and of the Communities and Member
States, in COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST 50-89 (J. Rahl ed. 1970); Johnson,
Newberg, Fox & Rahl, Extraterritorial Procedure and Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws of
the United States and of the Communities and Member States, id. at 117-35.
2. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 94-95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926) (parent corporation held not liable in tort action involving its subsidiary).
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these problems. Almost since the passage of the Sherman Act, 3 alien
corporations have been sued when acts committed abroad have adversely affected U.S. plaintiffs. The extraterritorial application of
antitrust law is well established. In most antitrust cases against
corporations, a single sixty-year-old statute governs venue and service of process. 4 There is nevertheless little agreement on its meaning.
After a brief review of the historical background, this Comment
will consider present problems and trends in the case law. Misconceived corporate law and intricate federal jurisdiction questions
have needlessly complicated the issues. International Shoe and
state long-arm statutes provide straightforward solutions.
II.

RECENT CASES

A reading of antitrust cases against alien or out-of-state parent
corporations reveals a variety of different approaches. As District
Judge Bownes explains, "A degree of confusion has pervaded this
area of the law." 5 The following three cases illustrate the contrasts
in extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction. The basic facts in each are
similar; all three involve Japanese manufacturers with domestic
subsidiary distributors.
A.

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. 6

Zenith Radio was a consolidation of two antitrust actions
brought by the Zenith Radio Corporation and the National Union
Electric Corporation against more than twenty Japanese and American corporate codefendants. 7 The complaints charged Japanese
manufacturers with the sale of consumer electronic products at
lower prices in the United States than in Japan. 8 These practices
were alleged to violate the antitrust laws, as well as various tariff
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (enacted as Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, §§ 18, 26 Stat. 209).
4. Clayton Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1970) (enacted as Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, §
12, 38 Stat. 736).
5. Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123, 130 (D.N.H. 1975).
6. 402 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
7. The cases were consolidated pursuant to the Multidistrict Litigation Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 (1970) (amended 1976) (rules of procedure amended 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. V 1975)).
In re Japanese Elecs. Prod. Antitrust Litigation, [1975-1) Trade Cas. ~ 60,105 (J.P.M.D.L.
1975).
8. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 244, 246 (E.D. Pa.
1975). For the Japanese consumer's side of this issue, see Thompson, Antitrust and the
Multinational Corporation: Competition or Cartels?, 8 INT'L LAW. 618 (1974).
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and antidumping provisions. 9 Eight of the defendants moved to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficient service of process. 10 All were Japanese corporations with either United States subsidiaries or controlling interests in Japanese
corporations with American operations or subsidiaries.
Interrelations among the moving and nonmoving corporate affiliates were analyzed in extensive findings of fact.11 Generally, the
court found that functional separations were formally observed, but
it found substantial overlap and identity in products handled,
use of trademarks, public representation, and actual corporate control.
The court's discussion of the legal issues dealt first with venue.
The court stated that if venue were proper, personal jurisdiction
could be obtained by extraterritorial process. 12 In antitrust actions,
venue and service of process for corporations are provided for by
section 12 of the Clayton Act which provides:
Any suit, action or proceeding under the antitrust laws against
a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district
whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may
be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases may
be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it
may be found. 13

The issue before the court was whether the activities of the moving
9. The complaints of both plaintiffs alleged violations of the Sherman Act §§ 1, 2, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, (1970) (amended 1974 & 1975); the Wilson Tariff Act § 73, 15 U.S.gc. § 8
(1970); the Anti-dumping Act of 1916, .5 U.S.C. § 72 (1970); and the Robinson-Patman Act
§ 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). In addition, the National Union Electric Corporation claimed
relief under the Federal Trade Commission Act§ 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970) (amended 1973 &
1975); the Zenith Radio Corporation claimed under the Clayton Act§ 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
Two companion opinions to the instant case, of the same name, dealt with motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. Counts brought under the Robinson-Patman Act were
dismissed, 402 F. Supp. 244 (1975) (both "legs" of a price discrimination violation must
involve sales or use in the United States). Motions to dismiss counts under the Antidumping
Act of 1916 were denied, 402 F. Supp. 251 (1975) (Act gave potential denendants adequate
notice and was not unconstitutionally vague).
10. 402 F. Supp. at 267.
11. Id. at 268-317. The findings offact were not only extensive; they were extraordinarily
complex. The defendants fit into five groups of affiliated corporations. The structures within
the groups ranged from the straightforward Japanese parent with American subsidiary distributor (Sharp Corporation, id. at 283-84) to the more elaborate pyramidal multinational
with vertically integrated distribution systems (e.g., Hitachi Limited, id. at 268-72, 288-95)
and horizontally integrated multinational conglomerate (e.g., Mitsubishi Corporation, id. at
279-83, 295-303, 312-17).
12. Id. at 317. See id. at 328-29.
13. 15 u.s.c. § 22 (1970).
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parent corporations constituted "transacting business" in the New
Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania forums.
The court found the "transacts business" standard to be much
broader than "found," "presence," or similar terms. 14 It noted that
the "plain remedial purpose" 15 of the section was to give injured
parties a local remedy and to substitute everyday commercial concepts for legal technicalities. Applying these concepts, the court
held that venue was proper. Each of the defendant corporate groups
marketed its products in the forums under common trademarks
through integrated sales systems; each group held itself out to the
public as a single entity .16
The court did not decide whether simple ownership of a local
subsidiary amounted to transacting business. It rejected, however,
the application of earlier case law which had held that subsidiary
ownership was, of itself, neither "presence" nor "doing business." 17
The defendants argued strongly that none of the acts alleged to
support venue was sufficient to show the parents' direct control of
their subsidiaries. However, the court held that such an approach
ignored "the actual unity and continuity of [their] whole course of
conduct." 18 The court concluded that viewed as a whole, "[t]he
. . . fact[s] . . . speak for themselves." 19 The relationships between the parent corporations and their subsidiaries transacting
business in the forum were "of sufficient intimacy" 20 that the parent
corporations could fairly be held to be transacting business there
themselves.
Without further discussion, the court held that in personam
jurisdiction over the moving defendants would not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. " 21 The court
asserted that since the defendants had been shown to be transacting
business, the due process tests of minimum contacts 22 and purposeful availment 23 were satisfied.
14. 402 F. Supp. at 318.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 327-28.
17. E.g., Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S . 333 (1925), discussed in
detail at notes 157-64, 176-98 infra and accompanying text .
18. 402 F. Supp. at 321, quoting United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S.
795, 817 (1948). See detailed discussion at notes 138-56 infra and accompanying text.
19. 402 F. Supp. at 328.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 329; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
22. 326 U.S . at 317, 319.
23. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
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O.S. C. Corp. v. Toshiba America, Inc. 24

Faced with facts similar to those in Zenith Radio, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached a different result and applied
a markedly different interpretation of the Clayton Act venue provision.25 Toshiba America was also an antitrust action against a Japanese parent corporation-in this case a manufacturer of desk calculators-and its domestic subsidiary. The alien corporation moved to
dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and lack of personal jurisdiction. The question before the court was again whether the alien
parent was "transacting business" within the meaning of section 12
of the Clayton Act.
The court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment 26 limited the scope of what constituted "transacting
business." 27 The parties agreed that the Japanese parent corporation, Tokyo Shibaura, had no agents, representatives, bank accounts, place of business, or property in California. All of Tokyo
Shibaura's sales were made in Japan to its wholly-owned subsidiary, which imported the calculators into America. 28 Following other
cases decided in the Ninth Circuit, 29 the court adopted the jurisdictional principles expressly rejected in Zenith Radio. 30 It held that
the presence of a subsidiary within the forum did not mean that the
parent was transacting business there. Thus, the court found no
basis upon which to find proper venue or to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
The court emphasized two factors. First, the court found that
the parent corporation and its subsidiary were separate entities. The
plaintiff had not sustained its burden of showing that the subsidiary
was managed and controlled by its alien parent. 31 Second, the court
stressed that deliveries took place in Japan. It ignored the plaintiffs
24. 491 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). See generally 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
249 (1974) .
25. Clayton Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1970).
26. I.e. , International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) and its progeny.
27. 491 F.2d at 1066.
28. Id. at 1065, 1066. It is not clear whether Tokyo Shibaura had any sales other than to
its American subsidiary, but all U.S. sales were made through the subsidiary.
29. Hayashi v. Sunshine Garden Prods., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 632 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd
sub nom. Hayashi v. Red Wing Peat Corp., 396 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1968) (per curiam); Wireline,
Inc. v. Byron Jackson Tools, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 955 (D. Mont. 1964), aff'd, 344 F .2d 331 (9th
Cir. 1965) (per curiam).
30. Compare 491 F.2d at 1067 with Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
402 F. Supp. at 319-21. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
31. I.e., other than as the sole shareholder.
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argument that this was a mere technical nicety. The court held that
while Tokyo Shibaura's calculators found their way into California,
their presence did not support the conclusion that the manufacturer
was transacting business in California. 32
C.

Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co. 33

In Hitt, the court divided section 12 into its two component
parts and considered the questions of venue and personal jurisdiction separately. The opinion was rendered in a pretrial consolidation
of twelve private antitrust actions. 34 The defendant Nissan Motor
Company, Ltd. (Nissan-Japan) challenged service of process in two
of the actions, and venue and personal jurisdiction in eight actions.
Nissan-Japan manufactured Datsun motor vehicles, equipment, parts, and accessories. These were sold to and shipped by the
Marubeni-America Corporation, 35 which delivered the products in
America to Nissan-Japan's wholly-owned subsidiary, Nissan-USA. 38
Nissan-USA was a California corporation authorized to do business
throughout the United States; it was the exclusive domestic wholesale distributor for Nissan-Japan's products.
Whether venue was proper turned on the court's construction
of the "transacts business" criterion. The court noted, as did the
court in Zenith Radio, that a liberal construction would be consonant with the congressional policies of expanding the availability of
venue and allowing injured parties to redress antitrust violations in
their home districts. 37 The test adopted by the court was "the practical everyday business or commercial concept of doing or carrying on
business of any substantial character. " 38
32. 491 F.2d at 1067-68.
33. 399 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
34. Id. at 838 n. *. In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 385 F. Supp. 1253
(J.P.M.D.L. 1974), adding to cases previously consolidated in 352 F. Supp. 960 (J.P.M.D.L.
1973). On the plaintiffs side, Hitt is an enormous class action suit, In re Nissan Motor Corp.
Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1977). The cases were inspired by a successful
Justice Department prosecution, United States v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., [1973-1]
Trade Cas. ~ 74,333 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (consent decree).
35. Marubeni-America Corporation was an export-import company and was 100% owned
by Marubeni-Japan. Marubeni-Japan owned 3.9% of the stock of Nissan-Japan, which owned
approximately 5% of Marubeni-Japan. New motor vehicles were transported on ships chartered by the subsidiary, Nissan Motor Car Carrier Company, Ltd., 399 F. Supp. at 846.
36. Id. at 845.
37. Id. at 840; Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. at 31718 & n.29 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573, 58288 (1948), modified, 337 U.S. 78 (1949).
38. 399 F. Supp. at 840. See United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795,
807 (1948).
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The court concluded that corporate separations between
Nissan-Japan and Nissan-USA, when viewed from the standpoint
of the average businessman, could not insulate the parent corporation from a finding that it was transacting business in the forum
districts. The court held that the parent's day-to-day control of its
subsidiary was not required. The subsidiary was organized as
Nissan-Japan's only means of distribution within the United States,
and, as such, was a "mere conduit . . . for entering and exploiting
the American market." 39 Also, Nissan-Japan had a number of representatives and technical advisors in the forum districts who assisted
with the sales and service functions of Nissan-USA. The court held
that these activities were enough to meet the broad "transacts business" test of section 12. The court additionally held that regardless
of the exact degree of influence over the subsidiary, "Nissan-Japan's
hold over Nissan-USA was sufficient to . . . control those decisions
which might involve violations of the antitrust laws. " 40
The holding that venue was proper in the districts where the
suits had originally been brought was buttressed by the court's holding that substantial sales within the districts constituted
"transacting business" within the meaning of section 12 of the Clayton Act. 41 In all the districts, sales were substantial from the average
businessman's point of view. That deliveries were made in Japan by
Nissan-Japan and shipped C.I.F.42 by Marubeni-America did not
alter the basic fact pattern. The court stated that to give "blind
deference to technicalities" would be to thwart the congressional
policy of applying everyday business concepts to the "transacts
business" requirement. 43
In the eight actions in which venue was challenged, NissanJapan also challenged the courts' ability to assert in personam jurisdiction over it. The court first reexamined the facts, enumerating
jurisdictional contacts rather than evidence of transacting business.
In addition to Nissan-USA's contacts on behalf of Nissan-Japan,
the court noted the parent's direct involvement in the management
39. 399 F. Supp. at 842. Contra, O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 491 F.2d at 106667 (9th Cir. 1974).
40. 399 F. Supp. at 842.
41. Id. at 843-44. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S.
359 (1927) (discussed in detail at notes 126-32 infra and accompanying text); Hartley &
Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp., 307 F.2d 916, 918-19 (5th Cir. 1962).
42. Risk of loss and title passed to Marubeni-America in Japan, 399 F. Supp. at 844 &
n.13. See U.C.C. § 2-320 & Official Comment 1.
43. 399 F. Supp. at 844.
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of Nissan-USA 44 as well as limited direct contact with the ultimate
purchasers of its products. 45
The court observed that the district courts could assert personal
jurisdiction over the defendant based on local state long-arm statutes. The court noted that the reach of these statutes is circumscribed by the fourteenth amendment, but that their application is
controlled by local law. Analyzing both the general requirements of
such statutes and the particular statutes and contacts in each case, 46
the court concluded that in each case Nissan-Japan had
"purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State . . . . " 47 Nissan-Japan had therefore
subjected itself to personal jurisdiction within the forums.
D.

Comparisons

The three cases differed greatly in their treatment of fundamental issues. The courts in Zenith Radio and Toshiba America
tended to blend venue and in personam jurisdiction into one issue,
while the Hitt court justified its findings on each independently. In
both Zenith Radio and Toshiba America, the critical question was
the amount of corporate control by the alien parent, while in Hitt
the degree of control was but one aspect of the alien parent's presence in the United States. Despite these similarities between Zenith
and Toshiba, the court in Zenith Radio viewed the interlocking
companies as single entities despite the absence of direct formal
control, while the Ninth Circuit, in Toshiba America, found day-today control essential to jurisdiction. Although the opinion in
Toshiba America stressed the fact that the parent's direct control
over the product in question ended with delivery in Japan, the
Zenith Radio and Hitt decisions treated this distinction as a technicality where the clear purpose and result of the parent's sales was
American export.
44. There was a great deal of overlap of directors, officers, and employees between the
two companies, id. at 845.
45. During the early part of the jurisdictional period, Nissan-Japan issued warranties
directly to retail purchasers of new Datsuns, id. at 846.
46. Id. at 847-54. There were two general classes of long-arm statutes. These were:
statutes allowing jurisdiction based upon a "tortious act" within the state, e.g., Mo. REV.
STAT. § 506.500.1(3) (1969) ("commission of a tortious act within this state"); statutes exerting jurisdiction over defendants "transacting business" within the state, e.g., id. §
506.500.1(1) ("transaction of any business within this state"). The court noted that
"transacting business" for purposes of state long-arm statutes was a question of minimum
contacts and not a question of federal law, 399 F. Supp. at 849-50. See notes 119, 336 infra.
47. 399 F. Supp. at 847; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
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Broad policy considerations are, at least on the surface, not the
crucial issues. 48 The courts differ on complex questions of jurisdictional and corporate law. The cases are like block puzzles, wherein
each of many solutions is apparently equally valid. There is no lack
of precedent; these issues have been litigated many times. The difficulty is that very little of the precedent is consistent.
III.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXTRATERRITORIAL
ANTITRUST JURISDICTION

To understand the present state of extraterritorial antitrust
jurisdiction, it is necessary briefly to review its history. The question
addressed throughout this Comment-to what extent do American
antitrust laws apply to alien corporations owning domestic subsidiaries but not doing business directly within the United States?-has
two parts. First, is the court competent to rule on the legality of acts
performed abroad by aliens; does the court have subject matter
jurisdiction? Second, can the court ''assert judicial power over the
parties and bind them by its adjudication"; 49 does it have personal
jurisdiction over the parties? The key to personal jurisdiction is that
the two issues are inextricably related.
A.

The Intent of Congress

Subject matter jurisdiction under the federal antitrust laws is
entirely statutory. Despite early common law doctrines prohibiting
contracts in restraint of trade, 50 the common law was generally ineffective in checking abuses of economic power. 51 Part of the novelty
of the Sherman Act 52 was putting federal teeth into trade regulation
policies. 53 The legislative history lends support to judicial assertions
about the competence of American courts to regulate the conduct
of aliens abroad and sheds light on the willingness of courts to "lift
the corporate veil" 54 and find personal jurisdiction over foreign or
48. But see 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 249, 254 (1974).
49. Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 224 (D.N.J. 1966).
50. See generally Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625,
629-46 (1960); Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REV.
355 (1954).
51. H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 36-53 (1955) (summarized at 50-53).
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
53. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS~ 139, at 23-24 (1967).
54. This phrase, which refers exclusively to situations involving parent-subsidiary relationships, is taken from Griffin, The Power of Host Countries Over the Multinational: Lifting
the Veil in the European Economic Community and the United States, 6 L. & PoL'Y INT'L
Bus. 375, 383 n.44, passim (1974). The terminology is helpful in distinguishing jurisdiction
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alien corporate parents in antitrust cases. 55
The basic American antitrust statute is the Sherman Act, 5Band
"the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition." 57
The Sherman Act was passed in 189058 to enforce a general belief in
the virtues of competition and to appease popular fears that massive
concentrations of capital and industry were taking over American
economic life. 59 Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes all contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade illegal.Bo Section
2 prohibits monopolization, and attempts or conspiracies to monopolize. Bl Section 2 complements section 1, and it has long been established that the two are to be read together.B 2 These are criminal
laws, and violators are guilty of a felony. B3 Civil enforcement, however, is also provided for and actively encouraged by the treble
damages provisions of section 4 of the Clayton Act.B 4
From the outset, the antitrust laws were intended to cover acts
performed abroad as well as in the United States.B5 During debates
over foreign corporate parents from other situations in which courts will "disregard the corporate fiction" or "pierce the corporate veil." See also Cohn & Simitis, "Lifting the Veil" in
the Company Laws of the European Continent, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 189 (1963).
55. But see P. AREEDA, supra note 53, ~ 106, at 5.
56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
57. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). See Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.).
58. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209.
59. See H. THORELLI, supra note 51, at 54-163 (summarized at 160-63); J. VANCISE,
UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 19-24 (7th ed. 1976). Just which theory carried the most
weight in Congress is debatable, id. at 214-21; see Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221 (1956).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975) provides in relevant part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975) provides in relevant part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony . . . .
62. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1911).
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (Supp. V 1975) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970) (formerly misdemeanors)).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (corresponds to Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890)
(repealed 1955)).
65. 21 CONG. REC. 2460-61 (1890) (speech of Sen. Sherman); id. at 3146, 3152 (remarks
of Sen. Hoar). See K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 19-21 (1958); w.
FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 6-8 (2d ed. 1973). See generally H.
THORELIJ, supra note 51, at 177-210.
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in the Senate, arguments were made that the bill's effects could be
easily evaded by entering into agreements abroad. 66 It was also
maintained that smaller American businesses would suffer while
foreign combinations and cartels, as well as the larger domestic
concentrations of wealth, which could also operate abroad, would
continue to flourish. 67 The bill which was finally passed, on the
authority of the commerce clause, 68 extended the coverage of the Act
to "trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations." 69 Congress felt the law could not be effective unless its
coverage was as broad as possible. The language in the Act purports
to give it effect in all cases involving foreign commerce. 70
B.

The Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Most of the foreign antitrust cases have been brought under the
first two sections of the Sherman Act, and the cases have generally
involved United States imports and exports of commodities. 71 As
Professor Brewster observed, "[t]he nub of all the cases . . . has
been an alleged clog in the free flow of goods." 72
Initially, courts were reluctant to assume jurisdiction over acts
performed abroad. 73 Since 1911, however, the cases have uniformly
66. 20 CONG. REC. 1458-62 (1889); 21 id. at 1765-72 (1890) (criticisms of Sen. George).
67. 21 id. at 1765-72 (1890) (criticisms of Sen. George); see generally H. THORELL!, supra
note 51, at 170-200. The constitutionality of legislation purporting to assert judicial power
extra territorially was seriously questioned, as was the power of Congress over goods that had
not yet entered or had passed out of interstate commerce. See notes 65-66 supra. Compare
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (manufacturing purely local; thus, the
Sugar Trust was not subject to the antitrust laws) with, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942) and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (Supp. V 1975) (same language in all three sections).
70. See also Sherman Act§ 6, 15 U.S.C. § 6 (1970), which provides quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over goods owned by combinations or being transported pursuant to an illegal agreement.
The section has rarely been used, and only in foreign commerce cases where jurisdiction could
not otherwise be obtained, e.g., United States v. 5,898 Cases of Sardines, Adm. No. 105-37
(S.D.N.Y. 1930), CCH FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, WITH SUMMARY OF CASES (1890-1951), Case
No. 373 (1952). See generally K. BREWSTER, supra note 65, at 20; W. FUGATE, supra note 65,
at 108-11. Section 8 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1970), expressly applies the Act's
provisions to "corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of.
any foreign country."
71. W. FUGATE, supra note 65, at 29 & n.1.
72. K. BREWSTER, supra note 65, at 77.
73. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (Holmes, J.).
[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.
Id. at 356;
[T]he acts causing the damage were done . . . outside the jurisdiction of the United

Published by SURFACE, 1977

11

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 5, No. 1 [1977], Art. 6

160

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 5:149

affirmed the will of Congress and applied the Sherman Act to agreements entered into abroad whose purpose or effect was to restrain
United States commerce. 74 Professor Rahl has noted:
Probably nothing does as well to make a legal boundary as does a
negative holding. But it appears that in the entire course of American antitrust history to date, only one reported litigated case, i.e.,
American Banana, has gone to final judgment for the defendant on
the ground that the facts were too remote territorially from the
statute's substantive reach. 75

This consistency has been maintained despite shifting theories sustaining extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction.
The rationale of many early cases was that when some overt act
of a criminal conspiracy had occurred within the United States, the
perpetrators could properly be held liable in the district courts. 76
The courts required some local activity upon which to base both
subject matter and personal jurisdiction. 77 As the extent of international trade has grown, the modern cases have gone much further. 78
States and within that of other states. It is surprising to hear it argued that they were
governed by the act of Congress.
Id. at 355. See generally The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824); Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64 (1804); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 17, 20 (1965).
Though strict territoriality no longer limits jurisdiction, the holding of American Banana
has not been overruled by any means; it is still good law under the act of state doctrine,
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 109-10 (C.D. Cal. 1971),
aff'd 461F.2d1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972). Compare Hunt v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3373 (Dec. 6, 1977) with Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977) .
See Simson, The Return of American Banana: A Contemporary Perspective on American
Antitrust Abroad, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 233 (1974). See also Kintner & Hallgarten,

Application of United States Antitrust Laws to Foreign Trade and Commerce-Variations
on American Banana Since 1909, 15 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 343 (1973).
74. Representative cases include United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927);
Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
106 (1911).
75. Rahl, Extraterritorial Substantive Scope of the Antitrust Laws of the Unitied States
and of the Communities and Member States, in COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST
56 (J. Rahl ed. 1970) (footnote omitted).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Nav. Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106 (1913);
United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische P.F.A.G., 200 F. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), 216 F. 971
(S.D.N.Y. 1914), rev'd as moot, 239 U.S. 466 (1916). See generally W. FUGATE, supra note
65, at 68-73. See note 312 infra.
77. Oseas, Antitrust Prosecutions of International Business, 30 CORNELL L.Q. 42 (1944).
78. The history is outlined in ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS, (OPPENHEIM] REPORT 65-83 (1955); SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW OF THE ABA,
ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968 40-60 (1968); Victor, Multinational Corporations: Anti-
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Under the "objective territorial principle," jurisdiction may be
based upon effects within the forum state. 79 The rule that has been
applied in antitrust cases was stated by Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa). 80 Judge Hand
held broadly that "any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that
has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends
81
• • • •"
Thus, any foreign act producing a prohibited effect in the
United States may be viewed as a violation of United States law.
Realizing, however, that trade restrictions anywhere in the world
might eventually have repercussions in the United States, Judge
Hand limited his rule to cases where the conduct was intended to
and did affect imports. 82 The Alcoa formula has since been modified
slightly, but its thrust remains the same. 83 The United States continues to assert sweeping subject matter jurisdiction over economic
acts performed abroad substantially affecting imports, exports, or
shipping. 84
trust Extraterritoriality and the Prospect of Immunity, 8 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 11, 11-16 (1973).
See also P . AREEDA, supra note 53, at 63-64 & nn .191-96; Kintner & Hallgarten, supra note
73, passim; Note, Extraterritorial Application of United States Law: A Conflict of Laws
Approach, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1006-10, 1017-20 (1976).
79. See The S.S. "Lotus," [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10; Rivard v. United States, 375
F.2d 882 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967).
80. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
81. Id. at 443.
82. Id. at 443-44.
83. Compare United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N .J. 1949), final
decree, 115 F. Supp. 835 (1953) (knowledge of a likely effect sufficient) with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 18(b) & Comment f (1965). See
generally K. BREWSTER, supra note 65, at 286-308; Griffin, supra note 54, at 398-401; Stokes,
Panel Discussion: Extraterritorial Application of Law, Limits Imposed by International Law
on Regulation of Commercial Activity, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. [PROC.] 135-41 (1970). See also
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1333-37, 1341-42 (2d Cir.
1972) (securities law; relation of extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction to personal jurisdiction) .
84. Whether the antitrust laws of the United States may extend to reach acts done
abroad is no longer an open question. Scholarly debate about the propriety and legality of
asserting jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct has nevertheless been extensive. In addition to the articles and treatises cited herein, see Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639 (1954); Jennings, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 146 (1957); Maechling, Uncle Sam's Long Arm, 63 A.B.A.J. 372 (1977); Seidl-Hohenveldern, The Limits Imposed by International Law on the Application of Cartel Law, 5 INT'L LAW. 279 (1971);
Timberg, Antitrust and Foreign Trade, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 411 (1953); Verzijl, The Controversy
Regarding the So-Called Extraterritorial Effect of the American Antitrust Laws, 8 NETH.
INT'L L. REV. 3 (1961).
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Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justices 5

At about the same time federal subject matter jurisdiction was
leaving national boundaries behind, personal jurisdiction was outgrowing the rigid formulas based on presence within a state. Acts
done abroad may allegedly violate antitrust laws because of their
effects on United States commerce, but the orders of a United
States court may only apply to those foreign corporations subject to
its jurisdiction in personam.s6 As restated in Judge Coolahan's lucid
review in Japan Gas Lighter Association v. Ronson Corp., s7
"[p]ersonal jurisdiction refers to the Court's ability to assert judicial power over the parties and bind them by its adjudication. Service of process is the corrollary [sic] requirement which sets the
Court's personal jurisdiction in gear. "ss
American courts have experienced difficulty in adequately describing the standards which delimit their ability to subject an outof-state or alien corporation to the courts' personal jurisdiction.s9
Part of the difficulty stems from ascribing anthropomorphic attributes to incorporeal statutory entities. 90 Jurisdiction over the person
once referred to the sheriffs ability to physically produce the defendant in court. 91 However, the fictious legal "person" of the corporation does not exist anywhere; through its agents it performs acts in
many places. 92 Much confusion has been generated by the use of
such terms as "presence," "found," and "inhabitant." 93 The history
of these Sisyphean labors of the law, as courts generated substitutes
for physical presence by analogy, is already well documented. 94 By
85. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940), adopted in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
86. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 108-12 (1969)
(stipulation by subsidiary that it and parent corporation were a single entity not binding upon
the parent which was neither named in counterclaim nor served; antitrust violations, abuse
of patents); Pennoyer, v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-24, 727, 729-30 (1877).
87. 257 F. Supp. 219 (D.N.J. 1966).
88. Id. at 224.
89. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 577
(1958).
90. See United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795, 802-03 (1948).
91. Levy, Mesne Process in Personal Actions at Common Law and the Power Doctrine,
78 YALE L.J. 52 (1968); Note, Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts Over Foreign
Corporations, 69 HARV. L. REV. 508, 509 & nn.6-7 (1956).
92. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
93. See, e.g., Clayton Act§ 12, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1970); United States v. Scophony Corp.
of America, 333 U.S. at 802; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 315-19.
94. See generally Current Legislation and Decisions, Foreign Corporations-Minimum
Contacts-Due Process, 36 J. AIR L. & CoM. 346, 347-48 (1970); Note, A Critical Evaluation
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the early part of this century there were a plethora of technical and
arbitrary tests for determining whether a corporation was "doing
business" in a jurisdiction and therefore amenable to service of
process. 95
In 1945 this amalgam of difficult and muddled distinctions was
all but swept away. 96 International Shoe Co. v. Washington 97 announced the modern rule that the corporate defendant must have
"certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.' " 98 Mr. Justice Black's separate opinion
criticized this formulation as vague and as having little or nothing
to do with the due process question raised by the case. 99 However,
the now famous "fair play" language only set forth the Court's
broad principles. The rule laid down in International Shoe tied the
extent of presence to the substantive reasons for which jurisdiction
was asserted:
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary
line between those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical
or quantitative . . . . Whether due process is satisfied must depend
rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the
fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose
of the due process clause to insure. 100

The first sentence quoted above criticized the complex distinctions that had developed under prior case law. International Shoe
effectively overruled cases that had depended on formal technicalities.101 The second sentence states the rule. Where there are only
of State Foreign Corporation Laws as a Bar to Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 12 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 416 (1970); Green, Federal Jurisdiction In Personam of Corporations and Due Process,
14 VAND. L. REV. 967, passim & n.1 (1961); Kurland, supra note 89, at 569-74, 577-86; Note,
Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts Over Foreign Corporations, 69 HARV. L. REV. 508, 50914 (1956); Foster, Personal Jurisdiction Based on Local Causes of Action, 1956 Wis. L. REV.
522, 527-40.
95. See Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.,
listing factors to be considered). See also Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511 (D.C.
Cir. 1943).
96. Kurland, supra note 89, at 586.
97. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
98. Id. at 316.
99. Id. at 323-26. See also Twerski, A Return To Jurisdictional Due Process-The Case
For The Vanishing Defendant, 8 DuQ. L. REV. 220, 224-28, 239-45 (1970) (criticizes "minimum
contacts" doctrine).
100. 326 U.S. at 319.
101. Especially suspect are corporate methods of doing business intended to evade regu-
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minimum contacts, subject matter of the suit and the substantive
laws being applied must relate to the type of activity supporting
jurisdiction within the forum. 102
The "mimimum contacts" doctrine of International Shoe was
clarified by a series of later decisions. 103 In McGee v. International
Life Insurance Co., 10' the defendant's only contact with the forum
state was to assume a resident's life insurance policy and accept
premium payments; all transactions were conducted by mail. This
tenuous contact was nevertheless held sufficient to subject the insurance company to the jurisdiction of the state courts on a claim
by the beneficiary of the policy. 105 In Hanson v. Denckla, 106 decided
soon after McGee, the Court pointed out that the International Shoe
principles did not do away with all restrictions on in personam
jurisdiction. 107 The Court held that those principles also defined the
limits of state court jurisdiction. Chief Justice Warren rephrased the
minimum contacts doctrine: "[l]t is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum . . . thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. " 108
Antitrust actions against aliens without domestic subsidiaries
have followed the International Shoe guidelines where there have
been only minimum contacts. In antitrust cases brought under the
Sherman Act the substantive issue is whether the corporate defenlation. See International Harvestor Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 584-85 (1914)
(state antitrust action); Kurland, supra note 89, at 586 & n.99 (reprinting portions of the
International Shoe Transcript).
102. 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 4.25[5], at 1173 (2d ed. 1977) summarizes the rule
that developed out of International Shoe:
If there are substantial contacts with the state, for example a substantial and continuing business, and if the cause of action arises [out] of the business done in the
state, jurisdiction will be sustained. If there are substantial contacts with the state,
but the cause of action does not arise out of these contacts, jurisdiction may be
sustained. If there is a minimum of contacts, and the cause of action arises out of
the contacts, it will normally be fair and reasonable to sustain jurisdiction. If there
is a minimum of contacts and the cause of action does not arise out of the contacts,
there will normally be no basis of jurisdiction . . . .
(Footnotes omitted.) See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 412-13
(9th Cir. 1977); Comment, International Shoe and Long-Arm Jurisdiction-How About
Pennsylvania?, 8 DuQ. L. REv. 319, 320-26 (1970).
103. See 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 4.25[4] (2d ed. 1977); Kurland, supra note 89,
at 593-623.
104. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
105. 355 U.S. at 223-24. See also Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
106. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
107. Id. at 251.
108. Id. at 253; 326 U.S. at 319.
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dant is distributing products pursuant to a restrictive agreement or
practice, or pursuant to an illegal cartel, conspiracy, or monopoly. 109
Unless the defendant's activities are so systematic and continuous
that he can be said to be present, 110 the jurisdictional test is whether
that defendant's contacts in the forum relate to or are in furtherance
of the violations charged.
In United States v. DeBeers Consolidated Mines, Ltd., 111 the
defendants were interrelated alien corporations controlling approximately ninety-five percent of the world's diamond output. Ninety
percent of DeBeers's diamonds were ultimately sold in the United
States. The court held that none of the defendants were "doing
business" so as to be subject to process. 112 Very few sales were made
by the defendants in the United States. 113 The court found that the
companies' New York bank accounts were incidental to their business there, and it noted that purchases of equipment in the United
States were only indirectly related to eventual distribution. 114 The
court reasoned that advertising alone could not constitute sufficient
contact for personal liability, since large domestic corporations did
not subject themselves to jurisdiction anywhere in the country simply by using national advertising. 115 The DeBeers opinion does not
expressly rely on International Shoe, but its analysis is similar.
None of the United States contacts were sufficiently related to distribution or to the cartel practices alleged to violate the antitrust
laws.
Obversely, two fairly recent decisions have based jurisdiction
on fleeting contacts that were the basis of the antitrust actions. In
Scriptomatic, Inc. v. Agfa-Gevaert, Inc., 118 in personam jurisdiction
over a Danish corporation was based on large United States sales,
infrequent mailings, and a "close relationship" to distributors. The
most significant contact, however, was a threatening transatlantic
telephone call which was the subject matter of the complaint. 117 In
109. See Sherman Act§§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (Supp. V 1975).
110. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Systems Operations, Inc., v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 414 F. Supp. 750, 754 (D.N.J. 1976).
111. [1948-1949] Trade Cas. ~ 62,248 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
112. This holding may be suspect today, see W. FUGATE, supra note 65, at 107.
113. [1948-1949] Trade Cas. ~ 62,248, at 62,480.
114. Id. at 62,479, 62,482. But see Crusader Marine Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 281 F. Supp.
802, 804 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
115. [1948-1949] Trade Cas. ~ 62,248, at 62,479-80.
116. [1973-1] Trade Cas. ~ 74,594 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
117. Id. at 94,632-35. As will be discussed at notes 271, 276 infra and accompanying text,
the court broadened the concept of forum under the "national contacts" theory.
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Cofinco, Inc. v. Angola Coffee Co., 118 the court concluded that the
alien corporate defendant's repeated transactions within the district
through telex communications, and the institution of arbitration
proceedings on behalf of all the defendants by one of them, clearly
brought them within the court's jurisdiction pursuant to the New
York long-arm statute. 119 The cases have more in common than
illustrations of electronic communications contacts. 120 In both cases,
the very limited intrusions into the forum were for the purpose of
furthering illegal conspiracies. 121 As in McGee, minimum contacts
were sufficient since they were directly related to the cause of action.
D. Alien Corporations Transacting Business Through Subsidiaries-Blurred Distinctions
Well before International Shoe was decided, Congress enacted
legislation liberalizing the availability of venue and service of process in antitrust actions against corporations. Section 7 of the Sherman Act had provided that persons injured by antitrust violations
could "sue therefore in any circuit court of the United States in the
district in which the defendant resides, or is found . . . . " 122 The
criteria of "resides" and "found" invoked the complex distinctions
involved in the tests of "presence" and "doing business." 123 Plaintiffs were often unable to seek a remedy in the place where they had
been injured. Congress sought to enlarge the choices of venue avail118. [1975-2) Trade Cas. ~ 60,456 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
119. Id. at 67,055-56; N.Y. C1v. PRAC. LAW§ 302(a) (McKinney 1972) provides in relevant
part:
As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court
may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state; or
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or
property within the state . . . .
120. See also Weller v. Cromwell Oil Co., 504 F.2d 927, 933 (6th Cir. 1974) (Phillips, C.J.,
dissenting). But cf. San Antonio Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 499 F.2d 349 (5th Cir.
1974) (interconnection of a communications network and sharing of long distance revenues
held insufficient to show that affiliated companies were transacting business locally).
121. [1973-1) Trade Cas. ~ 74,594, at 94,632, 94,635; [1975-2) Trade Cas. ~ 60,456, at
67,052-53.
122. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890) (repealed .955).
123. See People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918) (early
domestic case denying jurisdiction over out-of-state parent with local subsidiary). See
generally Harris, A Corporation as a Citizen in Connection with the Jurisdiction of the United
States Courts, 1 VA. L. REV. 507 (1914); Note, State Control over Foreign Corporations
Engaged in Both Interstate and Intrastate Commerce, 1 VA. L. R.Ev. 477 (1914).
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able to plaintiffs by enacting section 12 of the Clayton Act.1 24 This
section allowed suits against corporations to be brought "also in any
district wherein it may be found or transacts business. " 125
The first Supreme Court case to construe "transacts business"
was Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co. 126 Plaintiff filed the action at its Georgia corporate home, and the defendant
was served personally at its principal place of business in New York.
The Court held that the plain meaning of section 12 was that suits
could be brought wherever a defendant transacted business, and
process could be served wherever he could be found. The Court
noted the remedial purpose of the legislation and reasoned that the
additional language in the venue clause implied added meaning.
Defining the broader standard for venue, the Court held:
a corporation is engaged in transacting business in a district, within
the meaning of this section, in such sense as to establish the venue
of a suit-although not . . . "found" therein and . . . amenable to
local process,-if in fact, in the ordinary and usual sense, it
"transacts business" therein of any substantial character. 127

Most phrases the Court gives their plain meaning in the ordinary and usual sense soon evolve into legal terms of art, but the
everyday construction given "transacts business" is the key to
Kodak and is still good law. 128 Elements identified by the Court
included selling and shipping goods to local dealers and soliciting
124. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1970) (originally enacted as An Act To supplement existing laws
against unlawful restraints and monopolies, and for other purposes, ch. 323, § 12, 38 Stat.
736 (1914)), quoted in full in text accompanying note 13 supra.
125. Id. (emphasis added). A comprehensive review of the legislative history of section
12 may be found in United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573, 581-93 (1948),
modified, 337 U.S. 78 (1949); see also Eastland Constr. Co. v. Keasbey & Mattison Co., 358
F.2d 777, 780-81 (9th Cir. 1966). Unfortunately, the legislative history is not extensively
discussed in either Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 374
(1927), or United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948), both statutory
interpretation cases where the history would have been helpful.
126. 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
127. Id. at 373.
128. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795, 807 (1948). See Systems
Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 414 F. Supp. 750, 753 (D.N.J. 1976); In re
Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 407 F. Supp. 1285, 1291-92 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Grappone, Inc.,
v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123, 128 (D.N.H. 1975); Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co.,
399 F. Supp. 838, 840 (S.D. Fla. 1975). Compare Note, Venue in Private Antitrust Suits, 37
N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 268, 280-82 (1962) (ordinary everyday construction is broad and general, but
many courts look for contacts nevertheless) with Note, Antitrust Venue: Transacting Business Under the Clayton Act, 55 GEO. L.J. 1066, passim (1967) (analyzes factors of term of
art).
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business through salesmen and demonstrators. 129 The presence of an
agent within the district was deemed unnecessary. 130 The Court gave
the venue clause of section 12 an expansive construction in distinct
contrast to the clause governing process. 131 In the process clause, the
terms "found" and "inhabitant," like "present," determine where
the corporation may be served, establishing jurisdiction in personam.132
Section 12 has proved to be workable and relatively straightforward as applied to domestic parent corporations.1 33 Although the
degree of the corporate parent's control over a subsidiary in the
forum is relevant to whether the parent is transacting business locally, the parent's presence in the forum need not be established. If
venue is proper under the "transacts business" test, an out-of-state
corporation may be served in its state of incorporation or at its
principal place of business. 134 Nationwide service is not the same as
world-wide service, however.1 35 An alien corporate defendant must
somehow "inhabit" or be "found" in the district of the court issuing
service. 136 Thus, in a foreign antitrust case, the difficult questions
of "presence" and "doing business" reappear .137
The leading case on venue and personal jurisdiction over alien
corporations in antitrust suits is United States u. Scophony Corp.
129. 273 U.S. at 374. Neither activity would have sufficed to support personal jurisdiction.
130. Id. at 373.
131. Id. at 371-72.
132. Clayton Act§ 12, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1970) provides in part: "all process in such cases
may be served in the district of which [the corporation] is an inhabitant, or wherever it may
be found."
133. Contra, Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123, 130 (D.N.H.
1975).
134. See Jeffrey-Nichols Motor Co. v. Hupp Motor Car Corp., 46 F.2d 623 (1st Cir. 1931);
In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 407 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Call Carl, Inc.
v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367, 370, 378 (D. Md. 1975); C.C.P. Corp. v. Wynn Oil Co.,
354 F. Supp. 1275, 1278 (N.DV. Ill. 1973); Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 149 F. Supp.
830, 836-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See also Frederick Cinema Corp. v. Interstate Theatres Corp.,
413 F. Supp. 840, 841 (D.D.C. 1976).
135. See generally In re Fotochrome, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 26, 28-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (bankruptcy), aff'd, 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975). Some antitrust cases have construed section 12 as
authorizing extraterritorial service, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402
F. Supp. 262, 329 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Scriptomatic, Inc. v. Agfa-Gevaert, Inc., (1973-1] Trade
Cas. ~ 74,594, at 94,632-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A.,
244 F. Supp. 70, 79-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). This problem is discussed at notes 277-82 infra and
accompanying text.
136. Clayton Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1970). See note 132 supra.
137. United States v. DeBeers Consol. Mines, Ltd., (1948-1949] Trade Cas. ~ 62,248,
at 62,478, 62,480 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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of America. 138 Scophony is also the Supreme Court's most important
decision applying section 12 to parent corporations with local subsidiaries. The case strongly influences the outcome of all antitrust
suits against alien corporate parents. 139
The facts of the case were complicated and do not warrant
explaining in detail. 140 Scophony Corporation Ltd. (Limited) was a
British television technology firm trying to pull itself out of financial
distress. The firm executed a series of patent-licensing agreements
with three American companies and Scophony Corporation of
America (SCA), in which Limited was the dominant shareholder.
SCA was to have exclusive rights to the patents in the Western
Hemisphere, and Limited reserved rights to exploit the Eastern
Hemisphere. Partly because of the sheer complexity of the licensing
agreements, the parties could not cooperate. Limited's and SCA's
affairs came to a standstill. With both companies on the verge of
collapse, the Justice Department instituted antitrust proceedings,
seeking an injunction to prevent further territorial restraints of
trade.1 41
The district court dismissed the complaint against Limited for
lack of personal jurisdiction. The court held that it was settled law
that a parent corporation does not "do business" within a district
merely because of the presence there of its subsidiary. 142 The Supreme Court reversed. It held that through two agents present in
New York, Limited was carrying on substantial business there.1 43
Arthur Levy and W. G. Elcock, officers and directors of both SCA
and Limited, were continuously and strenuously engaging in the
only business Limited had: its American operations. 144 The Court
rejected Limited's arguments that it was only protecting its investments as a stockholder. 145 It also rejected the argument that the
corporate functions of SCA and Limited were so different that the
two should be treated independently. 146 The Court held that such an
approach ignored "the actual unity and continuity of the whole
138. 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
139. W. FUGATE, supra note 65, at 89.
140. In addition to the relation of the facts in the case itself, 333 U.S. at 796-802, rev 'g
69 F. Supp. 666, 667-69 (S .D.N.Y. 1946), the facts are summarized in W. FUGATE, supra note
65, at 89-90; 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 121-25 (1968).
141. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 69 F. Supp. 666 (S.D .N.Y. 1946).
142. Id. at 668.
143. 333 U.S. at 810.
144. Id. at 812, 815-16.
145. Id. at 812-16.
146. Id.
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course of conduct." 147 It concluded that "on the sum of the facts
[Limited] was 'found' [in the district] within the meaning of the
service-of-process clause of § 12." 148
The result in Scophony cannot be questioned. The reasoning
employed, however, has plagued courts ever since. In the lower
courts, venue was not an issue.14 9 When the case came before the
Supreme Court, venue was neither certified nor argued in the briefs
of either the Government or of British Scophony (Limited). 150 Nevertheless, the holding of Scophony was that "there can be no question of the existence of 'jurisdiction,' in the sense of venue under §
12, over Scophony in the Southern District of New York." 151
Throughout the case, the venue clause and the service of process
clause of section 12 are confused. The Court, in effect, held that
Limited was "found" in New York because it was transacting business there. 152
The Court dismissed as dicta statements in Kodak that venue
could be established where presence could not.1 53 This holding inverts the logic of Kodak and does violence to a plain reading of the
statute. 154 The expansive definition given "transacts business" in
Kodak was expressly based on the addition of language to the venue
clause that was not included in the process clause. 155 Scophony para147. Id. at 817.
148. Id. at 818.
149. 69 F. Supp. at 667.
150. Brief for the United States at 2, 16-19 (arguing that fifth amendment due process was controlled by the standards of International Shoe), Brief on Behalf of Appellee,
Scophony, Limited at 6, 7 (arguing separate corporate entities), United States v. Scophony
Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
151. 333 U.S. at 810.
152. William Fugate, former Chief of the Foreign Commerce Section of the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department, summarizes the holding as follows:
Thus, in obtaining jurisdiction of alien corporations in an antitrust case, the
Court will sustain such jurisdiction if the corporation is carrying on business of any
substantial character in the district, even though such activity may be through an
American subsidiary. It is unimportant whether this be considered as a liberalization
of the jurisdictional tests with respect to an interpretation of "found," or whether it
represents, in effect, a decision to apply the test of "transacts business" to service of
process as well as venue.
W. FUGATE, supra note 65, at 92. See id. at 107.
153. 333 U.S. at 809. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S.
at 371.
154. In Scophony, the Court noted that, "[a] plain and literal reading of the section's
words gives it [a] deceptively simple appearance." 333 U.S. at 802.
155. 273 U.S. at 374. See notes 126-32 supra and accompanying text.
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doxically held that this expansive definition was intended to apply
to the process clause as well. 156
E.

Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co. 157

One final bit of history complicates questions of in personam
jurisdiction over corporate parents with local subsidiaries. The most
familiar context in which "disregarding the corporate fiction" is an
issue is a situation where the plaintiff attempts to sue the shareholders of a corporation that is unable to satisfy its obligations. The issue
of shareholder liability, however, is not directly relevant to the question of whether a court may "lift the corporate veil" for jurisdictional purposes. 158 When the issue is the substantive liability of a
parent corporation, the parent pays the obligations created by the
subsidiary. When the issue is the amenability to suit of the parent,
the parent is subjected to jurisdiction where the subsidiary transacts some amount of business. The difference is that in the second
type of case, the parent is being sued for its own acts, and the issue
is whether it can be sued at all. 159
In People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co:, 160 an early
antitrust case, the Supreme Court held that ownership of stock in
local subsidiaries did not amount to presence in the forum under the
old "doing business" tests. This rule was affirmed and amplified in
the 1925 non-antitrust case, Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy
Packing Co. 161
Cannon was a diversity suit in contract brought by a North
Carolina corporation against the Maine parent of an Alabama corporation doing business in North Carolina. The Court found that
the wholly-owned subsidiary was completely dominated and controlled by the parent, in substantially the same way, and through
the same individuals, as were its branches and departments doing
156. 333 U.S. at 807-09, 817.
157. 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
158. Wellborn, Subsidiary Corporations in New York: When is Mere Ownership Enough
to Establish Jurisdiction over the Parent, 22 BUFFALO L. R.Ev. 681, 685-87 (1973). See generally
H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS §§ 140, 142 (rev. ed. 1946); w. CARY, Note on
Service of Process, in CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 147 (4th ed. unabr. 1969);
Comment, Jurisdiction Over Parent Corporations, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 574 (1963).
159. See Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand,
J.).
160. 246 U.S. 79 (1918).
161. . 267 U.S. 333 (1925) (Brandeis, J.). The case was noted approvingly in Ballantine,
Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CALIF. L. REV. 12 (1925).

Published by SURFACE, 1977

23

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 5, No. 1 [1977], Art. 6

172

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 5:149

business directly in other states. 162 Technically, however, the formal
separation was in all respects scrupulously observed. The parent
and subsidiary kept separate books. Transactions between the two
were recorded by each as if dealing with a stranger. The Court held
that the Maine corporation was not "doing business within the
State in such a manner . . . as to warrant the inference that it was
present there." 163 Cases concerning the substantive liability of a
defendant were deemed inapplicable.1 62
The rule in Cannon was that mere ownership and control of a
local subsidiary would not subject its out-of-state parent to local
jurisdiction. The Court held the formal separation was enough to
insulate the parent. Given the degree of control shown in the facts,
the case was remarkable. 165 Its holding was a major stumbling block
in the Scophony decision. The lower court in the Scophony case
expressly relied on Cannon. 166 It held that only control, not agency,
had been shown. Before the Supreme Court, the briefs of both Limited and the Government argued for and against the application of
the Cannon rule. 167
The Supreme Court carefully distinguished the facts in
Scophony from those in Cannon. The opinion refers directly to
Cannon only once, in passing, in a footnote. 168 The Court stated at
length, however, that the "manufacturing and selling cases on
which appellee relies" would not be applied. 169 The Court indicated
its distaste for the general approach of Cannon, but it left the
Cannon rule intact in situations where a parent manufacturer distributed its products through a subsidiary engaged only in selling. 176
Unfortunately, it is in exactly this context that the great majority
of antitrust actions are brought against alien corporate parents
today. 171
162. 267 U.S. at 335.
163. Id. at 334-35.
164. Id. at 337.
165. Ballantine, supra note 161, at 13.
166. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 69 F. Supp. at 668.
167. Brief for the United States at 34-35 (Limited's officers had so injected themselves
into the jurisdiction that the issue of SCA's agency was irrelevant), Brief on Behalf of Appellee, Scophony, Limited at 8, 10-11 (separate corporate entities were carefully maintained),
United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948). See Questions Presented,
Brief for United States at 2, Brief on Behalf of Appellee at 6, id.
168. "E.g., Cannon Mfg. Co . ... "333 U.S. at 813 n.23.
169. Id. at 812-15, 816-17.
170. Id. at 817.
171. E.g., O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 491F.2d1064 (9th Cir. 1974); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 262, 328 n.37 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Hitt
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PRESENT PROBLEMS AND TRENDS

The Progeny of Cannon and Scophony

As previously noted, 172 present case law takes widely disparate
approaches in applying section 12 of the Clayton Act. 173 The involuted logic of the Scophony opinion was perhaps bound to generate
more confusion than clarification. Mr. Justice Frankfurter thought
it was clear that Limited was "found" in New York and only concurred in the result in Scophony:
To reach this result, however, I do not find it necessary to open
up difficult and subtle problems regarding the law's attitude toward
corporations . . . . I am not prepared to agree [with the majority]
because I do not wish to forecast, which agreement would entail, the
bearing of the Court's discussion upon situations not now before us
but as to which such theoretical discussion is bound to be influential.174

This pronouncement correctly foreshadowed the paths the law
would take. In Scophony, the Court fudged on two major issues.
First, its construction of section 12 unnecessarily mangled the plain
meaning of the statute. Second, the Court equivocated on the question of when an alien or out-of-state parent corporation may be
subjected to jurisdiction based on the presence of its subsidiary. By
implying that Cannon was still good law, the Court helped keep the
case alive. 175
1.

CANNON TODAY

Today, Cannon leads a saltatory existence, alternately being
declared controlling or no longer good law. Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws cites Cannon as the leading case on jurisdiction
over parent corporations. 176 Most commentary recognizes Cannon as
the starting point for any discussion of the issue. 177 In actions involvv. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
172. See notes 5-48 supra and accompanying text.
173. 15 u.s.c. § 22 (1970).
174. 333 U.S. at 819.
175. Id. at 817. See text accompanying notes 168-70 supra.
176. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 52, Comment b, Reporter's Note
(1971). A caveat in the Reporter's Note, however, mentions that "(t]he bases of jurisdiction
discussed in this Comment should diminish in importance with the increasing adoption by
the states of 'long-arm' statutes . . . . " Id.
177. See Cardozo, A New Footnote in Erie v. Tompkins: "Cannon is Overruled,"; 36
N .C. L. REv. 181 (1958) (a light-hearted but perceptive dream conversation with J. Brandeis);
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ing antitrust, 178 patents, 179 and tort, 180 the case is still followed as
binding the court. 181
Cannon's continued viability, however, suffers from fundamental defects. Cannon was a case of federal common law decided well
before Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. 182 Although jurisdiction was
based on diversity, no local North Carolina decisions were cited. No
constitutional questions were decided.1 83 On the whole, this aspect
of Cannon has gone unnoticed in cases citing it. Most judges and
commentators criticizing Cannon have done so on the grounds that
it predates International Shoe. 184 Cannon employed the complicated
doing business tests of its time, under which significant amounts of
activity did not qualify as presence.1 85 Because International Shoe
dispensed with these criteria, the case should be discarded. 186 More
importantly, the Cannon rule operates without regard to the relationship between the cause of action and the degree of control or the
function of the subsidiary within the structure of the parent's business.187 Thus, both International Shoe and Erie should have overWellborn, supra note 158, at 683; Comment, Jurisdiction Over Parent Corporations, 51 CALIF.
L. REV. 574 (1963). See also Comment, Venue in Private Antitrust Suits, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV.
268, 288 (1962); Note, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations-An Analysis of Due Process,
104 U. PA. L. REV. 381, 404 (1955). Note, Parent-Subsidiary Corporations: Service of Process
to Acquire Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 668.
178. E.g., O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 491F.2d1064 (9th Cir. 1974).
179. E.g., Shapiro v. Ford Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 350, 352 (D. Md. 1973).
180. E.g., Harris v. Deere & Co., 223 F.2d 161, 162 (4th Cir. 1955) (holding that Cannon
precludes minimum contacts analysis and citing Scophony for support; McPheron v. Penn
Cent. Transp. Co., 390 F. Supp. 943, 949-56 (D. Conn. 1975).
181. See Crow Tribe of Indians v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 738, 740 (D. Mont.
1975) ("Although the International Shoe concept is most widely accepted, it appears that at
least in the Ninth Circuit, as to parent-subsidiary corporation relationships, the Cannon rule
is followed.").
182. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See M. Cardozo, supra note 177, passim; Wellborn, supra note
158, at 684; 1956 Wis. L. REv. 668, 670 n.10. Cf. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 94,
155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926) (B. Cardozo, J.) (questioning whether the N.Y. and the federal rules
were different).
183. 267 U.S. at 336. See Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. at 849.
184. See Wellborn, supra note 158, at 684-85; Comment, Jurisdiction Over Parent
Corporations, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 574, 574-78, 584-85 (1963); Note, Jurisdiction over Foreign
Corporations-An Analysis of Due Process, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 381, 404 (1955). See Hitt v.
Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. at 849; Stanley Works v. Globemaster, Inc., 400 F. Supp.
1325, 1331 n.9 (D. Mass. 1975) (patents); Flank Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp.
357, 361-63 (D. Colo. 1967) (antitrust, domestic); Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 149 F.
Supp. 830, 834-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (antitrust; domestic).
185. 267 U.S. at 334-35.
186. Contra, Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops, Inc., 246 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1957) (diversity
suit in contract).
187. See 267 U.S. at 336-37. In the district court, however, this relationship was one
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ruled Cannon. 188
Scophony did not overrule Cannon, however, and antitrust
cases follow Scophony's lead when dealing with Cannon. There are
three categories of conclusions about what Seophony 's lead was.
S cophony stated expressly, but in dicta, that Cannon would still be
controlling were the parent and subsidiary engaged in the "very
different businesses and activities of manufacturing and selling." 189
Thus, faced with a distributor subsidiary, some courts will not find
either venue or personal jurisdiction over the parent corporation
unless the relationship is one of agency. 190 On the other hand, the
majority of courts, focusing on the general thrust of Scophony, hold
that Cannon does not apply in antitrust actions. 191 Especially in
suits against aliens, a variation on this theme has been to ignore
Cannon completely. The court bases proper venue on liberal transacting business standards, and then employs state long-arm statutes to establish personal jurisdiction. 192 Finally, many courts adopt
ground for the court's holding. See note 347 infra. See also McPheron v. Penn Cent. Transp.
Co., 390 F. Supp. 943, 955-56 (D. Conn. 1975) (jurisdiction over holding company denied in
tort action where participation in subsidiary's affairs was unrelated to operations).
188. Wellborn, supra note 158, at 685.
189. 333 U.S. at 817.
190. Foreign antitrust: O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 491 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir.
1974); Williams v. Canon, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1977); I.S. Joseph Co. v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Minn. 1976); Intermountain Ford Tractor
Sales Co. v. Massey-Ferguson Ltd., 210 F. Supp. 930 (D. Utah 1962), aff'd, 325 F.2d 713 (10th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964) (facts strong enough to show agency) . Domestic:
San Antonio Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 499 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1974); Tiger Trash
v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., [1976-2] Trade Cas. ~ 61,141 (S.D. Ind. 1976), rev 'd, 560
F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1977); In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 407 F. Supp. 1285 (N.D. Ga.
1975); United States ex rel Martin-Trigona v. Bankamerica Corp., [1974-1] Trade Cas. ~
74,916 (D.D.C. 1974), dismissed for lack of standing sub nom. Martin-Trigona v. Federal
Reserve Bd., 509 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Frito-Lay, Inc . v. Procter & Gamble Co., 364 F.
Supp. 243 (N.D. Tex. 1973); Hayashi v. Sunshine Garden Prods., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 632 (W.D.
Wash. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Hayashi v. Red Wing Peat Corp., 396 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1968);
Fisher Baking Co. v. Continental Baking Corp., 238 F. Supp. 322 (D. Utah 1965) .
191. Foreign antitrust: Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp.
at 318-21; Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. at 842-43; Audio Warehouse Sales, Inc. v.
U.S. Pioneer Elecs. Corp. , [1975-1] Trade Cas. ~ 60,213, at 65,831 -32 (D .D.C.), vacated as
moot, id. ~ 60,293 (D.D.C. 1975) (Pioneer settled). Domestic: Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of
America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123, 130-31 (D.N.H. 1975); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391
F. Supp. 367, 372-73 (D. Md. 1975); Luria Steel & Trading Corp. v. Ogden Corp., 327 F. Supp.
1345 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Flank Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 357, 361-65 (D. Colo.
1967); Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 149 F. Supp. 830, 834-35 (S.D .N.Y. 1957). See
generally W. FUGATE, supra note 65, at 94-101.
192. Meat Systems Corp. v. Ben Langen-Mo!, Inc., [1976-1] Trade Cas. ~ 60,965
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., [1975-1] Trade Cas. ~ 60,308
(S.D. Tex. 1974) ; Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 55 F.R.D. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
I{offman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70, 75-76, 80 (S .D.N.Y. 1965) .
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Scophony's approach of avoiding the issue by distinguishing
Cannon from the facts before them.1 93 Whatever the better argument, whether the Cannon rule applies in antitrust cases is still an
open question. 194
The need for some rule makes the Cannon case attractive. 195 A
court must base its decision on something, and the "transacts business" standard for proper venue is imprecise. Thus, courts have
continued to apply the Cannon rule notwithstanding the case's fundamental defects, Scophony's criticism of Cannon in antitrust
cases, and Cannon's total inapplicability to questions of venue. 196
No case has found venue proper for a parent under section 12
using the Cannon case for support. However, that opinion stated,
"[ t]he defendant wanted to have business transactions . . . in
North Carolina, but . . . did not choose to enter the State in its
corporate capacity." 197 Admittedly, "business transactions" was not
used as a term of art. Under section 12, however, venue is proper if
a defendant "transacts business" "in the ordinary and usual
sense." 198 This approach would avoid some of the problems Cannon
has caused in antitrust, but realistically it adds little as a means
toward clarifying the issues.
2.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Courts have also experienced difficulty grappling with
Scophony's confusion of venue and process. The general result
reached by the Supreme Court in Scophony was that when Congress
expanded the availability of venue, it similarly meant to expand
193. See Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., [1974-1] Trade Cas. ~ 75,100 (D . Ore.
1974), aff'g on rehearing 362 F. Supp. 54, 64 (D . Ore. 1973); Phillip Gall & Son v. Garcia
Corp., 340 F . Supp. 1255 (E .D. Ky. 1972) (domestic); Intermountain Ford Tractor Sales Co.
v. Massey-Ferguson Ltd., 210 F. Supp. at 938-39. See generally cases cited notes 191-92 supra.
See Wellborn, supra note 158, at 693-99; Comment, Jurisdiction Over Parent Corporations,
51 CALIF. L. REv. 574, 580-84 (1963).
194. Two very recent Court of Appeals decisions may help lay Cannon to a well-deserved
final rest, see Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 412-13 (9th Cir.
1977) (essentially limiting Cannon to its facts without expressly overruling prior Ninth Circuit
decisions); Tiger Trash v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 560 F.2d 818, 822-24 (7th Cir. 1977),
reu 'g [1976-2] Trade Cas. ~ 61,141 (S.D . Ind. 1976) .
195. Flank Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co. , 277 F. Supp. 357, 364 (D. Colo. 1967) .
196. See Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123, 130-31 (D .N.H.
1975) .
197. 267 U.S . at 336 (emphasis added).
198. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. at 807, 819; Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. at 373.
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process. 199 Yet, the Court did not follow through and construe
"found" broadly. 200 Dicta in both Scophony and Kodak indicated
that section 12 did not authorize extraterritorial service or service
outside of some district's boundaries. 201 The Government argued
that the limits defined by the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause should be applied by analogy to the fifth amendment. 202 However, the Court rejected this notion, stated that there was no constitutional question, and refused to apply the tests of International
Shoe. 203 Instead, the Court held that because Limited was transacting business in New York, it was found there as well.
Blending the two clauses leads to two contradictory results,
both of which have been upheld by the courts. First, the defendant may argue that since venue under section 12 is equivalent to
personal jurisdiction, he may only be sued in a district where he is
found or is an inhabitant. This conclusion was adopted, in effect,
in the Toshiba America case where the court held-relying on
Cannon, a jurisdictional case-that there were too few contacts to
find that the defendant was transacting business in the district. 204
Second, the plaintiff may argue that since venue is equivalent to
jurisdiction, an alien defendant is liable to an antitrust suit, and
extraterritorial process may be issued, wherever he is transacting
business. This result was adopted in Zenith Radio, 205 relying on
Scophony. 206
Courts which have tried to fathom the distinction between
"transacts business" and "found" have had some measure of difficulty in applying it. The broad outlines of the "transacts business"
199. 333 U.S . at 810, 817, notwithstanding id. at 813. Congress did not do this, Clayton
Act § 12, 15 U.S .C. § 22 (1970) ; Flank Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 357, 359
(D. Colo. 1967).
200. 333 U.S. at 813.
201. Id. at 817; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co. , 273 U.S. at 371.
202. See note 150 supra.
203. 333 U.S. at 804 n.13.
204. 491 F.2d at 1066, 1067-68. See Williams v. Canon, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 376, 380 (C.D .
Cal. 1977). See also Weinstein v. Norman M. Morris Corp., 432 F. Supp. 337, 341-42 (E.D.
Mich. 1977); Pacific Tobacco Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 338 F . Supp. 842, 844-45 (D.
Ore. 1972).
205. 402 F. Supp. at 317, 328-29. See text accompanying notes 12, 21-23 supra.
206. See generally Systems Operations v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 414 F. Supp. 750,
752 (D.N.J. 1976) ("venue and jurisdiction under [section 12 of the Clayton Act] are to be
viewed as congruent"); Pacific Tobacco Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 338 F. Supp. 842,
844 (D. Ore. 1972). See also Fashion Two Twenty, Inc. v. Steinberg, 339 F. Supp. 836, 842
(E.D.N .Y. 1971) (the "transacting business" standard of 15 U.S.C . § 22 is essentially the
same as the "doing business" test of 28 U.S.C . § 1391); City of Philadelphia v. Morton Salt
Co., 289 F . Supp. 723, 724 (E .D. Pa. 1968).
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test are clear and have already been summarized. 207 But where, for
example, there is general agreement that shipping a substantial
volume of goods into a district constitutes transacting business in
that forum, there is disagreement over whether this includes shipping the goods F. 0 .B. from some other place or district. 208 Most
courts agree that the "transacts business" test is in some way
broader than the tests for "found" or "present, " 209 but explicitly
defining how much broader has proved troublesome. 210 The court in
Flank Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co. 211 forthrightly noted: "[E]ven
though it is clear that some distinction does exist between the venue
and service requirements of Section 12, the nature and meaning of
that distinction is somewhat of a mystery. " 212
Delimiting the "transacts business" test when a defendant's
only contacts within a forum are through ownership of a subsidiary
has proved even more elusive. 213 The tendency of courts has been to
decide whether a corporate parent "transacts business" locally in
terms of corporate control. To rule in any close case, of course, the
court must first decide: how much control? A wide spectrum of
results exists. 214 At one extreme is the Scophony case, in which
207. See notes 124-32 supra and accompanying text.
208. Compare B.J. Semel Assocs. v. United Fireworks Mfg. Co., 355 F.2d 827, 831-32
(D .C. Cir. 1965); Frederick Cinema Corp. v. Interstate Theaters Corp., 413 F. Supp. 840, 84243 (D.D.C . 1976); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123, 131-32
(D.N.H. 1975); Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. at 844 with 0.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba
America, Inc., 491 F.2d at 1067; B.J. Semel, 355 F.2d at 833-36 (Burger, J., dissenting); FoxKeller, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 338 F. Supp. 812, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See
also Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1144 (7th Cir. 1975) (patent
infringement) .
209. See notes 126-32 supra and accompanying text. See Comment, Venue in Private
Antitrust Suits, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 268, 280-81 (1962).
210. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Wilshire Oil Co., 523 F.2d 125, 131 (10th Cir.
1975) . The court stated:
We are aware that some courts hold that there is a difference-that fewer contacts are required in order to transact business than are required in order to do
business.
On the other hand, numerous decisions hold that the two terms are the same.
(Footnotes omitted.) Kolb v. Chrysler Corp., 357 F. Supp. 504, 508 (E.D. Wis. 1973)
("Precedents . . . offer little assistance."); Note, Antitrust Venue: Transacting Business
Under the Clayton Act, 55 GEO. L.J. 1066, 1069-70 (1967) .
211. 277 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1967).
212. Id. at 359.
213. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
214. Recent cases discussing "control" are considered at notes 294-300 infra and accompanying text. Cases and practice through 1962 are compiled in Note, Transacting Business
as a Basis for Venue Over a Corporation Under the Antitrust Laws, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 261,
270-71; Comment, Venue in Private Antitrust Suits, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 268, 288-90 (1962).
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Limited's control was subject to the effective veto of SCA's two
American shareholders. 215 At the other extreme, some courts have
required evidence that the parent controls the subsidiary's day-today affairs. 216
When the parent company is an alien corporation, the distinction between "transacts business" for purposes of the venue clause
of section 12 and "found," the operative word in the process
clause, 217 often evaporates completely. This is partly because the
Scophony opinion blended the two clauses to reach its result. 218 A
more fundamental reason is that a court's involved factual analysis
of contacts and control, establishing proper venue, parallels the
process that the court would use to demonstrate the minimum contacts required to support in person am jurisdiction. 219 Since
Scophony, no case finding proper venue for an alien parent corporation has not also upheld personal jurisdiction. 220 Where a court has
not found proper venue, consideration of the jurisdictional question
has been unnecessary. 221
The available precedent is wide-ranging and offers little in the
way of specific guidance. Courts are free to pick and choose from a
smorgasbord of tests and approaches. An inevitable result has been
that often enough a court will base its opinion on as many tests
supporting its position as it reasonably can. 222 Which issues are central is often left unclear.
215. 333 U.S. at 800. See Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. at 841.
216. See note 158 supra. See also K.J. Schwartzbaum, Inc. v. Evans, Inc., 44 F.R.D. 589,
591-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (daily activities controlled by parent corporation's executives).
217. "[Alll process in such cases may be served in the district of which [a corporation]
is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found." Clayton Act§ 12, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1970). No
alien corporation is an "inhabitant" of any U.S. district, see Scophony, 333 U.S. at 817.
218. See notes 149-56 supra and accompanying text.
219. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. at 328-29;
Intermountain Ford Tractor Sales Co. v. Massey-Ferguson Ltd., 210 F. Supp. 930, 939 (D.
Utah 1962), aff'd, 325 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964). But cf.
Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. at 845-50 (reconsidered the facts to establish jurisdiction).
220. See 333 U.S. at 817. See generally cases cited notes 190-92 supra.
221. E.g., 0.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 491 F.2d at 1068; I.S. Joseph Co. v.
Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1023, 1024-25 (D . Minn. 1976).
222. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. at 327-28;
Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 55 F.R.D. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) . But see United
States v. Scophony Corp. of America, which held:
[Tlhe determination [is not] to be made for such an enterprise by atomizing it into
minute parts or events, in disregard of the actual unity and continuity of the whole
course of conduct . . . .
333 U.S. at 817. See generally Comment, Venue in Private Antitrust Suits, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV.
268, 282-86 (1962).
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To an alien corporation's management and shareholders, it can
hardly seem like "fair play and substantial justice" when the jurisdictional rules for violations of United States antitrust laws are
different throughout the United States. It is important to keep in
mind that "[t]he concepts of personal jurisdiction and of venue are
closely related, but nonetheless distinct. " 223 Seo phony and its progeny have focused on the "transacts business" standard, but that
only controls venue. Legal analysis of the issue of personal jurisdiction has often been obscured and has sometimes been omitted altogether.224
B.

Venue for Aliens

A way out of the difficult and circuitous paths generated by the
Scophony opinion can be found by ignoring the Clayton Act venue
provisions. The general venue provisions provide that "[a]n alien
may be sued in any district." 225 Unless section 12 of the Clayton Act
must be applied exclusively, venue should never be a bar to an
antitrust suit brought against an alien corporation.
An analogous problem arises in patent suits against aliens. For
a time, this issue was more difficult in a patent suit than in antitrust
because two Supreme Court decisions have held that "28 U.S.C. §
1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions . . . . " 226 Both cases invalidated the use
of the general corporate venue statute227 in the face of congressional
policy to limit the forums available to plaintiffs. 228 However, these
cases were distinguished from suits against aliens in Japan Gas
Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp. 229 The court held that section 1400(b)
did not limit venue in suits against aliens. 230 Judge Coolahan
223. Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 224 (D.N.J. 1966).
224. See, e.g., 333 U.S. at 818; 402 F. Supp. at 328-29; 491 F.2d at 1066, 1068.
225. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1970).
226. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957); accord,
Stonite Prod. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 563 (1942).
28 U.S .C. § 1400(b) (1970) provides:
Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district
where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has com~itted acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.
227. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1970).
228. 353 U.S. at 224-27; 315 U.S. at 565-66.
229. 257 F. Supp. 219 (D.N.J. 1966). See Seilon, Inc. v. Brema S.p.A., 271 F. Supp. 516
(N.D. Ohio 1967); Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Molins Org., Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 436 (E.D.
Va. 1966).
230. Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. at 225. The court additionally distinguished its holding from Fourco on the ground that it was hearing a declaratory
judgment action rather than an infringement suit per se.
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pointed out that the requirement that the court obtain personal
jurisdiction over the defendant was itself a serious practical barrier. 231
This view was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Brunette
Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc. 232 The Court stated
broadly that "suits against aliens are wholly outside the operation
of all the federal venue laws, general and special." 233 Brunette may
yet be limited to patent cases, but the extreme breadth of the language quoted above certainly suggests its application in antitrust
suits against alien corporations. 234 Prior to Brunette, only one antitrust case had applied 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) in a suit against an alien
corporation. 235 Today, this approach, while not widely utilized, is
generally accepted. 236
Treating the Clayton Act as supplementing rather than supplanting the general venue provisions would make sense even if
Brunette had never been decided. 237 The Fourco case held the patent
venue provision to be exclusive because it embodied a congressional
231. Id. at 229.
232. 406 U.S. 706 (1972).
233. Id. at 714 (emphasis added). See In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653 (1893) (alien does not
inhabit any district and may be sued wherever it can be served).
234. W. FUGATE, supra note 65, at 93; E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON, supra note 1, at 41-42;
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW OF THE ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 362 (1975); cf. UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS (1977), reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799, at E-1, E-3
n.20 (Feb. 1, 1977), and in TRADE REG. REPORTS (CCH) No. 266, pt. II, at 8 n.20 (Feb. 1, 1977)
(citing Cofinco, Inc. v. Angola Coffee Co., [1975-2] Trade Cas. ~ 60,456 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
which finds venue proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d)) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST GUIDE].
235. Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381, 387
(S.D. Ohio 1967); see W. FUGATE, supra note 65, at 93 & n.7.
Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) had
applied section 1391(d), and not the Clayton Act, to an individual defendant, but did not
consider that section's application to a corporation. See also Albert Levine Assocs. v. Bertoni
& Cotti, S.p.A., 314 F . Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) .
236. Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659, 661
(D.N.H. 1977); Cofinco, Inc. v. Angola Coffee Co., [1975-2] Trade Cas. ~ 60,456, at 67,056
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Norman's on the Waterfront v. West Indies Corp., Civ. No. 515/1973 (D.V.I.
July 17, 1974); Scriptomatic, Inc. v. Agfa-Gevaert, Inc., [1973-1] Trade Cas. ~ 74,594, at
94,632 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See note 234 supra. See also Ballard v. Blue Shield of S.W. Va., Inc.,
543 F.2d 1075, 1080 (4th Cir. 1976); Board of County Comm'rs v. Wilshire Oil Co., 523 F.2d
125, 129-30 (10th Cir. 1975); Goggi Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 422 F. Supp. 361, 364
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123, 133 (D.N.H.
1975).
237. Cf. Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202 (1966) (Fourco doctrine limited to patent
infringement suits; Jones Act venue provisions not exclusive).

Published by SURFACE, 1977

33

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 5, No. 1 [1977], Art. 6

182

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 5:149

mandate to alleviate burdens on defendants. 238 Section 22 of the
Clayton Act was designed to expand the choice of forums available
to plaintiffs. 239 These policy considerations are diametrically different. It would be unreasonable to infer that Congress took away with
one hand what it gave with the other. 240
C.

Federal Due Process-Radical Approaches

Dispensing with some of the mystery and confusion surrounding antitrust venue for aliens leaves the question: When may a
federal court assert personal jurisdiction over an alien corporation?
Consideration of the exclusively federal nature of antitrust and
other federal actions has led to new horizons in extraterritorial jurisdiction. The meaning of the familiar phrase "due process" takes on
a fresh look when viewed in the context of the fifth, rather than the
fourteenth amendment. 241
Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co. 242 is a
"seminal case." 243 In this antitrust suit, the Italian corporate defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper
venue. 244 The question was whether service of process pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 4(d) and (e) and the Ohio
long-arm statute 245 was valid. The court reasoned that "jurisdiction
over the person . . . does not relate to . . . the particular court . . .
238. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957). See notes 226-28
supra and accompanying text.
239. See notes 122-25 supra and accompanying text.
240. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Wilshire Oil Co., 523 F.2d 125, 130 (10th Cir.
1975); California Clippers, Inc. v. United States Soccer Football Ass'n, 314 F. Supp. 1057,
1062-63 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Albert Levine Assocs. v. Bertoni & Cotti, S.p.A., 314 F. Supp. 169,
170 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70, 83-84
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
241. "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law . . . . "U.S. CONST. amend. V; accord, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
242. 289 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
243. Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287, 291 (D. Conn. 1975). In fact,
the first case to endorse this argument was First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp.,
209 F. Supp. 730, 736-39 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) (domestic defendant). This case, in turn, relied
on the groundbreaking article by Thomas Green, Federal Jurisdiction In Personam of Corporations and Due Process, 14 VAND. L. REV. 967 (1961). However, both Green and First Flight
were primarily concerned with problems in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 that were
substantially alleviated by the 1963 amendments. See generally Smit, International Aspects
of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 CoLUM. L. REV. 1031 (1961); 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 435
(1976). See note 250 infra.
244. 289 F. Supp. at 384, 387, 389-91.
245. Omo REV. CooE ANN. §§ 2307.381-.385 (Baldwin 1975) ( § 2307.383 repealed in 1971,
replaced by Omo R. C1v. P. 4.3, 4.6(A); § 2307.384 repealed in 1971, replaced by Omo R. C1v.
P. 3(B)).
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hearing the controversy, but to the power of the unit of government
of which that court is a part." 246 Since federal law was being applied,
due process should be construed under the fifth amendment. The
Sherman Act prohibited violations in interstate and foreign commerce. Jurisdiction, accordingly, could logically be founded upon a
defendant's "presence," or minimum contacts, within the United
States as a whole. 247
The last step is quite a leap. Many courts have been willing to
accept the notion that fifth amendment due process is at issue in
federal question cases. Most have assumed, however, that presence
or minimum contacts in the district (or in the state, since district
courts have statewide process) 248 were required. 249 Thus, the great
majority of cases treat fifth amendment jurisdictional due process
as equivalent, not just analogous, to fourteenth amendment due
process. 250
Since Moriarty, a number of cases have considered whether a
federal court may base in personam jurisdiction upon a defendant's
national contacts. 251 A few cases have expressly based jurisdiction
on this theory. 252 The courts in these cases have misread Moriarty 253
246. 289 F. Supp. at 390; Green, supra note 243, at 967-68, 985. See von Mehren &
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, passim
(1966).
247. 289 F. Supp. at 390 and cases cited.
248. FED. R. C1v. P. 4(f).
249. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. at 809, 817-18, 819; Brief for
the United States at 38-46, id.; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273
U.S. at 372-74; Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143-44 (7th Cir.
1975); Fisons Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1241, 1249-50 (7th Cir. 1972); Volkswagen
Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen, 360 F.2d 437, 440 n.3 (1st Cir. 1966). See 9 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 435, 440 & nn.24-26.
250. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 416 n.7, 424 n.19 (9th
Cir. 1977); 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 4.25[7], at 1183 (2d ed. 1964). Much of the pre1963 case law discussing fifth amendment due process had the limited objective of showing
that federal jurisdiction in personam was no less than that of the states. See Green, supra
note 243, passim; Smit, supra note 243, at 1032-40; Note, Jurisdiction of Federal District
Courts Over Foreign Corporations, 69 HARV. L. REV. 508 (1956). See generally 2 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE~~ 4.31, 4.32(2], 4.41-1(3] (2d ed. 1964).
251. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d at 416-19 and cases
cited; Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974); Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1339-42 (2d Cir. 1972); Centronics Data Computer Corp. v.
Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659, 661-64 (D.N.H. 1977), and cases cited at 663; Scriptomatic, Inc. v. Agfa-Gevaert, Inc., [1973-1] Trade Cas. ~ 74,594, at 94,633-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
252. Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659, 663-64
(D.N.H. 1977) (antitrust, service pursuant to state law, id. at 661); Cryomedics, Inc. v.
Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287, 289-92 (D. Conn. 1975) (patent infringement, service pursuant to state long-arm statute, id. at 288); Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354,
357-58 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (admiralty, method of service not discussed); Alco Standard Corp.
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and have devised their own jurisdictional law. 254 It is elementary
that for service to be valid it must be statutorily prescribed. 255 There
must be a coherent chain linking venue, the power of the court
subject to due process, and a statute authorizing service calculated
to provide adequate notice. 256
The Moriarty court, after developing its "national contacts"
theory of jurisdiction, pointed out that it could not apply this theory
under existing federal law or rules. 257 FRCP 4(e) provides that a
district court may use state long-arm statutes (or U.S. statutes)
"under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the statute . . . . " 258 The special supplementary provisions for extraterritov. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 25-26 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (securities, service pursuant to FED. R.
C1v. P. 4(i)(l)(C)).
253. Compare Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F . Supp. at 291 and Holt v.
Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. at 357 with Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. at 663 and Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber
Co., 289 F. Supp. at 390. See text accompanying notes 257-62 infra.
254. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d at 418. The court in
Centronics Data frankly admits this, 432 F. Supp. at 664.
255. 72 C.J.S. Process§ 27 (1951); 62 AM. JuR. 2D Process§§ 5, 7 (1972). See Wells Fargo
& Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d at 416; Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp.
838, 846-47 (S .D. Fla. 1975); Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289
F. Supp. at 390.
256. See generally Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219 (D.N.J.
1966).
257 . 289 F. Supp. at 390. See generally Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328
(1838) .
258. FED. R. C1v. P. 4(e) provides in part:
Service upon party not inhabitant of or found within state. Whenever a statute
of the United States or an order of court thereunder provides for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant
of or found within the state in which the district court is held, service may be made
under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the statute or order, or, if
there is no provision therein prescribing the manner of service, in a manner stated
in this rule. Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court
is held provides (1) for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of
summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state, or (2) for
service upon or notice to him to appear and respond or defend in an action by reason
of the attachment or garnishment or similar seizure of his property located within
the state, service may in either case be made under the circumstances and in the
manner prescribed in the statute or rule.
There is a slight difference in FED. R. C1v. P. 4(d) which provides in part:
Service shall be made as follows:
(7) Upon a defendant of any class referred to in paragraph . . . (3)
[corporations] of this subdivision of this rule, it is also sufficient if the summons
and complaint are served in the manner prescribed by any statute of the United
States or in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which the district court
is held for the service of summons or other like process upon any such defendant in
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rial federal process in FRCP 4(i)(l) only come into play "[ w]hen
the federal or state law referred to in subdivision (e) of this rule
authorizes service upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within
the state in which the district court is held . . . . " 259 The Moriarty
court read "under the circumstances" to mean that the use of state
long-arm jurisdiction was only appropriate where there were state
contacts. 260 This point is settled law in diversity cases; 261 it has not
been definitively established either way in federal question cases.
However, most of the cases discussing U.S. contacts have required
state contacts, or at least have alternately based jurisdiction on
state law. 262 Whether due process is construed under the fifth or the
fourteenth amendments, the use of state long-arm requires state
contacts.
FRCP 4(e) also provides for federally authorized extraterritorial
process. In such a case, due process would be construed solely under
the fifth amendment, and national contacts might be appropriate. 263
The Clayton Act may be read to authorize extraterritorial service,
but care must be taken to avoid indiscriminately mixing the statutory provisions or confusing venue with jurisdiction. 264 For example,
mechanically adding Scophony (in extraterritorial antitrust, venue
and jurisdiction are equivalent) 265 to Brunette (an alien corporation
an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of that state.
Whether the omission of the phrase "under the circumstances" in 4(d)(7) is exploitable is
highly suspect. The court in Centronics Data, however, expressly relied on 4(d)(7) and not
4(e), 432 F. Supp. at 661.
259. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(i)(l).
260. 289 F. Supp. at 390. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW OF THE ABA, ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS 364 (1975) .
261. Compare Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 222-27, 230-31 (2d Cir.
1963) (en bane) (Friendly, J.) and Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F .2d 508, 516-22
(2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly, J., concurring) with Arrowsmith, 320 F.2d at 234-44 (Clark, J.,
dissenting) and Jaftex, 282 F.2d at 510-16 (overruled) (Clark, J.). See generally 2 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 4.25[7] & nn .13-14 (2d ed. 1964); cases cited in id. ~ 4.25[7] at 72-74
(1977-78 Supp.); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 246, at 1123 & n.6; 9 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 435, 438-40 & n.23 (1976).
262. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d at 418-19; Honeywell,
Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1141-44 (7th Cir. 1975); Graham Eng'r Corp. v.
Kemp Prods. Ltd., 418 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Ag-Tronic, Inc. v. Frank Paviour Ltd.,
70 F.R.D. 393 (D. Neb. 1976).
263. See 556 F.2d at 418.
264. Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 224-25 (D.N.J. 1966).
See generally Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953); Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663 (1953); 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~~ 0.140(1.-2], 0.140[3] (2d
ed. 1977).
265. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948); see notes 149-56,
199-206 supra.
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is subject to suit anywhere) 266 would lead to the absurd result that
any alien anywhere in the world may be sued in the district courts. 267
A more tempting, but similar, error results from pairing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391 (d) with the process clause of section 12 of the Clayton Act.
Section 12's process clause provides that "all process in such
cases may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or
wherever it may be found. " 268 If the section is read as a coherent
whole, "such cases" refers to cases where venue is based on
"transacting business." 269 There is no statutory basis for applying
the process clause where venue is based on section 1391 (d). 270 Assuming arguendo that "wherever it may be found" does mean
"wherever in the world," circumventing the "transacts business"
requirement would permit suits where the defendant had few if any
factual connections. 271 The same problem arises if "national contacts" are the basis for the court's jurisdiction over an alien. Under
this theory, since an alien may be sued anywhere, the only limit on
where the defendant could be sued is the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. 272 These illogical results are avoided if section 12's process clause is employed only when that section's venue requirements
are met. Similarly, suits against aliens should be limited to courts
which can clearly demonstrate personal jurisdiction. 273
266. Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706 (1972); see
notes 232-40 supra.
267. Apparently argued anyway in Weinstein v. Norman M. Morris Corp., 432 F. Supp.
337, 339 (E.D. Mich. 1977) . Cf. C. C1v. art. 14 (Fr.); Smit, Common and Civil Law Rules of
In Personam Adjudicatory Authority: An Analysis of Underlying Policies, 21 INT'L & CoMP.
L.Q . 335, 340 n.19 (1972) (the French courts have jurisdiction in any case where the plaintiff
is French).
268. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1970) (emphasis added). The full statute is set forth in text accompanying note 13 supra.
269. Contra, Scriptomatic, Inc. v. Agfa-Gevaert, Inc., [1973-1] Trade Cas. ~ 74,594, at
94,632 (S .D.N.Y. 1973) (an "obvious fallacy").
However, the interpretation suggested in text has usually been assumed. There has been
little discussion about whether this must be so. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. at 317, 329; Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367, 370
(D. Md. 1975). See notes 133-34 supra and accompanying text.
270. See notes 257-62 supra and accompanying text.
271. See Scriptomatic, Inc. v. Agfa-Gevaert, Inc., [1973-1] Trade Cas. ~ 74,594, at
94,633-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
272. Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659, 664
(D.N.H . 1977); Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287, 290 (D. Conn. 1975).
Taking the "national contacts" theory one step further, forum non conveniens would only
apply rarely. Since the alien must come all the way to the United States, it would not be
that much more inconvenient if he had to travel a few miles inland. But see Holt v. Klosters
Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354, 359 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
273. Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219 (D.N.J. 1966). See In
re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 660-62 (1893).
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If venue is based on a finding that the defendant "transacts
business" in the district, then process may be served "wherever
[the defendant] may be found." 274 If "wherever" means wherever
on earth, then a U.S. statute provides for extraterritorial service,
and the special federal methods of FRCP 4(i)(l) may be employed. 275 Due process would be guaranteed by the fifth amendment.
However, only one court considering the contacts necessary for process to be validly issued under the Clayton Act and Rule 4(i)(l) has
yet held that only national contacts were required. 278
. There are many possible interpretations of the language
"wherever it may be found" in the process clause of section 12. 277
The semantic distinctions produce little difference in practical application. First, the language, when enacted, was certainly intended
to mean in whatever district the defendant might be found. 278 A
274. 15 u.s.c. § 22 (1970).
275. See note 259 supra and accompany ng text. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(i)(l) provides in
relevant parts:
[I]t is also sufficient if service of the summons and complaint is made . . . (C) upon
an individual, by delivery to him personally, and upon a corporation or partnership
or association, by delivery to an officer, a managing or general agent; or (D) by any
form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk
of the court to the party to be served; or (E) as directed by order of the court.
276. Scriptomatic, Inc. v. Agfa-Gevaert, Inc., [1973-1] Trade Cas. ~ 74,594, at 94,63335 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The holding is of dubious validity since the court based venue on 28
U.S.C. § 1391(d). See notes 268-73 supra and accompanying text.
See generally Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 4, 8-9 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. at 317, 329-30; Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co.,
399 F. Supp. at 840, 846-47.
277. Decisions involving the extraterritorial application of the securities laws are also
relevant because the special venue statute controlling actions brought under the securities
laws contains much of the same language as that found in section 12 of the Clayton Act.
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1970) (set forth in full in text accompanying note 13 supra) with 15
U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), which provides in part:
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this title . . . may be
brought in any such district or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an
inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such cases may be served in any
other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may
be found.
Recent cases have provided a great deal of material for journals and law reviews. See,
e.g., Comment, The Extraterritorial Reach of American Economic Regulation: The Case of
Securities Law, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 315 (1976); Note, Securities and Exchange Commission
v. Kasser: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Securities and Exchange Cases, 4 SYR. J. INT'L L.
& COM. 141 (1976); 11 TEX. INT'L L.J. 173 (1976); 27 MERCER L. REV. 844 (1975); 7 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 770 ( 197 4).
278. See Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 55 F.R.D. 519, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
In re Electric & Musical Indus., Ltd., 155 F. Supp. 892, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW OF THE ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 363 (1975).
This assumption was a major stumbling block in Scophony. See notes 200-03 supra and
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second and more modern interpretation would accept this intention,
but construe "found" as equivalent to presence or doing business or
subject to suit by virtue of local contacts. 279 A third view would take
the language as literally authorizing extraterritorial service. 280 However, any statute authorizing extraterritorial service must require at
least minimum contacts as a prerequisite. 281 Thus, the second and
third interpretations above produce the same result. The defendant's liability to suit in either case must be predicated upon
"certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.' " 282
In summary, the contacts required to assert jurisdiction over an
alien corporation in antitrust are generally subject to traditional
fourteenth amendment due process. In most cases, a state long-arm
statute has been employed, or jurisdiction is based on state longarm. If venue is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d), a state long-arm
statute should be employed. In the very narrow range of possible
cases where the court uses section 12 of the Clayton Act and a
method of service pursuant to FRCP 4(i)(l) which is not state longarm, it must still be shown, for venue to be proper, that the defendant transacts business within the district .. There is presently no
statutory authority that would justify a court's basing jurisdiction
solely on the national contacts of the alien.
accompanying text. See also Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326,
1340 (2d Cir. 1972).
279. Thus, in most actual cases, this question is never raised where service is made
pursuant to state long-arm statutes. E.g., Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. at 846-54;
Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., [1975-1] Trade Cas. ~ 60,308, at 66,215 (S.D.
Tex. 1974). See generally Comment, Venue in Private Antitrust Suits, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 268,
276-80 (1962).
280. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. at 329, 330;
Scriptomatic, Inc. v. Agfa-Gevaert, Inc., [1973-1] Trade Cas. ~ 74,594, at 94,633 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Intermountain Ford Tractor Sales Co. v. Massey-Ferguson Ltd., 210 F. Supp. 930, 939 (D.
Utah 1962), aff'd per curiam, 325 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964).
See also Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d at 1340.
281. See Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. at 79.
282. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See Hunt v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 4, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., 402 F. Supp. at 329-30.
283. Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 CoLUM. L. REV. 341, 348-50 (1947);
Griffin, supra note 54, at 389-90; Griffin, Foreign Governmental Control of Multinational
Corporations Marketing in the United States, 2 SvR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 179, 184 (1974);
Wellborn, supra note 158, at 690-95; Comment, Jurisdiction Over Parent Corporations, 51
CALIF. L. REV. 574, 580-82 (1963). See also Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co.,
556 F .2d 406, 422-26 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Agency and Entity

Despite the theoretical appeal of federal jurisdiction in personam based on national contacts, an alien corporation should only
be subject to suit where there are sufficient state contacts. Cases
holding parent corporations subject to jurisdiction based upon the
local activities of a subsidiary may be divided into two broad categories.283 In one, the subsidiary is said to be the agent of the parent;
in the other, the two are held to be parts of a single entity. The
general outlines of these concepts have changed little over the
years. 284 Antitrust cases against alien parent corporations, at least
in their use of terminology, generally fall into one or both of these
categories.
Courts have used a number of tests and standards in determining whether a subsidiary is the agent of its parent and whether the
parent may validly be subject to the court's jurisdiction. 285 Alternative formulations such as "adjunct," "instrumentality," "alter
ego," "branch," "creature," are common but are not helpful since
they add nothing to an analysis of the problem. 286 Generally, the
issue involves the extent of the parent's domination and control of
the affairs of the subsidiary. Scrupulous formal separation, however, is not inconsistent with a great deal of control and dominaton.287 There is little the 100% stockholder cannot do legitimately
through selection of directors and review of their actions, or through
manipulation of the bylaws to provide greater shareholder participation, that could be done by a branch supervisor. 288 Viewing the
issue as whether or not shareholder power exceeds that permitted
284. See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926) ("We find in
the case at hand neither agency on the one hand, nor on the other abuse to be corrected by
the implication of a merger."); E. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 60-63
(1936); F. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 89-102, 147-50 (1931); Ballantine,
supra note 161, at 15.
285. See Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md. 1975); Audio Warehouse Sales, Inc. v. U.S. Pioneer Elecs. Corp., [1975-1) Trade Cas. ~ 60,213 (D.D.C.),
vacated as moot, id . ~ 60,293 (D.D.C. 1975); Intermountain Ford Tractor Sales Co. v. MasseyFerguson Ltd., 210 F. Supp. 930 (D. Utah 1962), aff'd per curiam, 325 F.2d 713 (10th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964).
286. Ballantine, supra note 161, at 18. See also E. LATTY, supra note 284, at 156-92;
Douglas & Shanks, Insulation From Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J.
193, 195-96 (1929).
287. See Williams v. Canon, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 376, 380 (C.D. Cal. 1977); United States
v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y.),
reargument denied, 134 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Comment, Jurisdiction Over Parent
Corporations, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 574, 579-80 (1963).
288. See generally DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Michie Supp. 1976); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW §§ 620(b), 701 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978).
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by statute compels decisions like Cannon and its contemporary
equivalents. 289 They require "day-to-day control" of the affairs of
the subsidiary for the parent to be held liable. 290
Cases holding that corporate affiliates comprise a single economic entity use a variety of tests that are more amorphous, and
yet more consistent, than the agency cases. The value of the singleentity approach is its broad, practical flexibility, and no court has
limited the concept with a static definition. 291 The factors supporting a finding that two corporations will be regarded for jurisdictional
purposes as parts of a larger whole include: (1) whether both companies hold themselves out to the public as one business through
shared trademarks and brand names, advertising, or business addresses; (2) whether the subsidiary has independent business of its
own, or if its only function is to perform services for the parent; (3)
whether the subsidiary is an integral part of the overall business of
the parent; (4) whether directors, officers, or employees hold positions in both enterprises or are freely transferred between the two. 292
Ownership amounting to effective control but not agency is also an
element to be considered. On the whole, the single-entity approach
allows courts to concentrate on business realities without being
bound by the rigid technicalities of agency analysis. 293
In a variation on the agency approach, many courts will sustain
289. This view of the issue also leaves the parent's liability to suit in the hands of the
company's lawyers. Comment, Jurisdiction Over Parent Corporations, 51 CALIF. L. REV. at
581.
290. See cases cited note 190 supra.
291. The test suggested by Wellborn is whether "it is reasonable to conclude that the
parent and subsidiary constitute a 'single economic entity.'" Wellborn, supra note 158, at
688 (italics omitted).
292. See Meat Systems Corp. v. Ben Langen-Mol, Inc., [1976-1] Trade Cas. ~ 60,965
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. at 329-30;
Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. at 850; Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co.,
Ltd., 55 F.R.D. 519, 528-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Flank Oil Corp. v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F.
Supp. 357, 359-61, 364-65 (D. Colo. 1967); Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 149 F. Supp.
830, 831-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See generally Griffin, Foreign Governmental Control of Multinational Corporations Marketing in the United States, 2 SvR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 179, 187 (1974).
See also Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 425-26 (9th Cir. 1977)
(trademark infringement); SCM Corp. v. Brother Int'l Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1328, 1332-35
(E.D.N.Y. 1970) (patent infringement); Boryk v. deHavilland Aircraft Co., 341F.2d666, 66769 (2d Cir. 1965) (wrongful death).
293. Wellborn, supra note 158, at 688-89, 698-702. In antitrust cases, this type of analysis
blends nicely into the everyday construction given the "transacts business" test for venue
purposes. See United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. at 810-17; Lee's Prescription Shops, Inc. v. Glaxo Group Ltd., [1977-1] Trade Cas. ~ 61,499 (D.D.C. 1977) (per
curiam); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. at 317-28. See notes
126-32 supra and accompanying text.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol5/iss1/6

42

Kingery: Jurisdiction in Antitrust

1977]

Jurisdiction in Antitrust

191

jurisdiction in antitrust cases where the parent "controls" its subsidiary. Use of the term "control" avoids the need to find a common
law agency. 294 The term has a strong, commonsense appeal. Analytically, however, "control" is a meaningless test because the standards associated with it vary so widely. Some courts are still following Cannon. They require day-to-day control by the parent before
finding jurisdiction or venue under the "transacts business" test. 295
On the other hand, some courts require very little actual control. An
example is Hitt, where the court first ritually admitted that "mere
whole ownership of a subsidiary doing business within a forum is
insufficient to justify jurisdiction over the foreign parent . . . . " 296
Somewhat surprisingly, a factor considered by the court in finding
personal jurisdiction was the "control potentially exercisable" over
the subsidiary. 297 It seems fundamental that the 100% shareholder
should always have at least potential control. 298 Intermediate tests
are whether the parent "controlled the essential business decisions
and operations" of its subsidiary, 299 and "whether the parent's control is sufficient to influence and control those decisions which
might involve violation of the antitrust laws." 300 Thus, the consistent "control" terminology produces totally inconsistent results.
In many cases, the agency and entity approaches are mixed. 301
294. See K. BREWSTER, supra note 65, at 59; Comment, Jurisdiction Over Parent
Corporations, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 574, 581-82 (1963).
295. San Antonio Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel., 499 F.2d 349, 352 (5th Cir. 1974)
(domestic); Williams v. Canon, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 376, 380 (C.D. Cal. 1977); In re Chicken
Antitrust Litigation, 407 F. Supp. 1285, 1293-94 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (domestic).
296. Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. at 850.
297. Id.
298. See also Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 149 F. Supp. 830, 833-35 (S.D.N.Y.
1957) (domestic; the presence of wholly-owned subsidiaries satisfies the "transacts business"
standard.).
299. Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123, 134 (D.N.H. 1975).
300. Audio Warehouse Sales, Inc. v. U.S. Pioneer Elecs. Corp., [1975-1] Trade Cas. ~
60,213, at 65,832 (D.D.C.), vacated as moot, id. ~ 60,293 (D.D.C. 1975); Flank Oil Co. v.
Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 357, 365 (D. Colo. 1967).
301. E.g., Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367, 371-78 (D. Md. 1975); Tokyo
Boeki (U.S.A.), Inc. v. SS Navarino, 324 F. Supp. 361, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("all these facts
illustrate that Boeki USA was both, in practical effect, the same entity as Boeki Japan for
some purposes and its agent for other purposes."). Call Carl also illustrates the problems that
arise when state common law causes of action are joined to the federal antitrust claims, 391
F. Supp. at 370-76, 377-78 (personal jurisdiction upheld with regard to each cause of action),
403 F. Supp. 568 (D. Md. 1975) (directed verdict for defendants on antitrust claims; damages
reduced in action for fraud), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 554 F.2d 623 (4th Cir. 1977)
(defendants also won on fraud counts). Similar is Systems Operations, Inc. v. Scientific
Games Dev. Corp., 414 F. Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1976) (cited notes 110, 128, & 206 supra), 425
F. Supp. 130 (D.N.J.) (product defamation injunction proper, no violation thereof), rev'd, 555
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Sometimes they are confused and the results are awkward. In the
landmark New York decision Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc., 302 the court found an agency relationship between two
second-tier sister corporations, both subsidiaries of related U.S. parents.303 A branch of Hilton Credit Corporation, Hilton Reservation
Service (Service), accepted and confirmed reservations in New York
for the London Hilton Hotel, owned by Hilton Hotels (U.K.) Ltd.
(Hilton (U.K.)). The New York plaintiff was allowed to assert jurisdiction over Hilton (U.K.) in tort for injuries suffered in the London
Hilton. The court held that Service was the New York agent of
Hilton (U .K.) because "Service does all the business which Hilton
(U.K.) would do were it here by its own officials." 304 It is difficult
to accept the finding of agency on its face. 305 Domination and control
may well have been exercised by the parents, but not by Hilton
(U.K.) over Service. 306 The court expressly held that the working
relationship between the two entities, not the fact of common stock
F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1977) (injunction dissolved; district court erred in its choice of law) (antitrust action still pending).
In terms of result, the sole difference between the agency and entity categories is that
only if agency is shown will service upon the subsidiary bind the parent. See Intermountain
Ford Tractor Sales Co. v. Massey-Ferguson Ltd., 210 F. Supp. 930, 938-39 (D. Utah 1962),
aff'd, 325 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964); H. BALLANTINE, supra
note 158, § 140. See generally Stanley Works v. Globemaster, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 1325, 133536 (D. Mass. 1975) (domestic; patents); Tokyo Boeki (U.S.A.), Inc. v. SS Navarino, 324 F.
Supp. 361, 366-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
395 U.S. 100, 108-12 (1969).
302. 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281N.Y.S.2d41, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967).
303. The stock relationships between the various corporations were complex. Hilton
Hotels (U.K.) Ltd. owned and operated the London Hilton Hotel. Hilton (U.K.) was a British
corporation, nearly all the shares of which were owned by Hilton Hotels International, Inc.
Hilton International was a Delaware corporation, doing business in New York, which owned
directly or through subsidiaries many hotels outside of the United States. Hilton International was partly owned by Hilton Hotels Corporation and partly by the public. Hilton
Reservation Service was a branch of the Hilton Credit Corporation. Hilton Credit was owned
jointly by Hilton International and Hilton Hotels Corporation. Thus, Hilton Credit (with its
Service branch) and Hilton (U.K.) were both second-tier subsidiaries of Hilton Hotels Corporation, and each was at least partly owned by Hilton International. Id. at 540, 227 N .E.2d at
855-56, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 47 (dissent).
304. Id. at 537, 227 N.E.2d at 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
305. Griffin, supra note 54, at 397; 19 N. Y.2d at 539-44, 227 N .E.2d at 855-58, 281
N.Y.S.2d at 46-50 (Breitel, J., dissenting). Judge Breitel disagreed with the majority on the
grounds that (1) Hilton (U.K.) was held to be "present," not subject to long-arm jurisdiction,
(2) without any showing of misrepresentation or commingling of corporate activity. On the
other hand, he referred to "the widespread Hilton Hotel enterprises" and "the Hilton complex," and admitted that "a layman would view them" as a single entity. Id. See also
Wellborn, supra note 158, at 700-01.
306. Griffin, supra note 54, at 397.
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ownership, gave rise to the agency. 307 However, in a suit against an
alien car manufacturer and its New York distributor, the franchises'
only business was handling the products of the manufacturers. 308
The New York court distinguished Frum mer and found no agency,
and no jurisdiction over the manufacturer, because the companies
were separately owned. 309
An even more unusual variant of the normal parent subsidiaryagent relationship arose in the well-known Swiss Watch case. 310
Seeking extraterritorial jurisdiction over two of the defendants, the
government asserted that two U.S. parents were the agents of their
Swiss subsidiaries. 311 The court rejected this unique argument; it
was unwilling to hold that the subsidiaries dominated and controlled their parents. 312 The court did find jurisdiction was proper,
but on the grounds that each parent and its subsidiary were in fact
a single entity. 313 Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, whatever
the language used by the New York Court of Appeals, may also be
more realistically viewed as a case where the court found that the
corporate affiliates acted as one. 314
Commentators have found much to quarrel with in the case
law. Joseph Griffin's comprehensive comparative survey of this area
suggests that courts have not carefully examined the factual issues
307. 19 N.Y.2d at 538, 227 N.E.2d at 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
308. Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 29 N.Y.2d 426, 278 N.E.2d 895, 328 N.Y.S.2d 653
(1972).
309. Id. at 431, 278 N.E.2d at 897, 328 N .Y.S.2d at 656. The cases are compared and
discussed in Griffin, supra note 54, at 395-97, and Wellborn, supra note 158, at 700-02.
310. United States v . Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, 133 F. Supp. 40
(S.D.N.Y.), reargument denied, 134 F . Supp. 710 (S.D .N.Y. 1955). The facts and background
of the case are discussed in depth in Haight, The Swiss Watch Case, in COMMON MARKET AND
AMERICAN ANTITRUST 311-63 (J. Rahl ed. 1970). See 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 127-32 (1958).
311. 133 F. Supp. at 46.
312. Id. at 46-48; K. BREWSTER, supra note 65, at 60. Contra, Johnson, Newberg, Fox &
Rahl, Extraterritorial Procedure and Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws of the United States
and of the Communities and Member States, in COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST
117, 134 (J. Rahl ed. 1970); E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER
37-38 (1974).
In a later opinion, the court used the terminology, "the agency the law finds between
members of a conspiracy," but this finding was based on their status as affiliates, not on
control. 134 F. Supp. at 712. The conspiracy theory for purposes of jurisdiction found its
zenith in Giusti v. Pyrotechnic Indus., 156 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1946), but is rejected today,
e.g., Intermountain Ford Tractor Sales Co. v. Massey-Ferguson Ltd., 210 F. Supp. 930, 933
& n .3 (D . Utah 1962), aff'd per curiam, 325 F .2d 713 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U .S.
931 (1964) .
313. 133 F . Supp. at 46-48. K. BREWSTER, supra note 65, at 60-61.
314. Griffin, supra note 54, at 396-97 ; Wellborn, supra note 158, at 700-02.
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of intercorporate control. 315 At least in American antitrust, however,
courts are willing to undertake exhaustive factual analysis. 316 Defendants are more likely to win motions challenging jurisdiction where
discovery has been minimal. 317 More to the point is Griffin's observation that the concepts of agency and entity are not directly relevant to the boxes-within-boxes structure of the modern multinational.318 Similarly, Charles Wellborn's survey of New York cases
concludes that they make little sense in terms of agency and should
be more rationally considered from the point of view of "single economic entity" analysis. 319 Both writers note that the legal terms,
with which courts categorize the facts before them, oversimplify and
tend to distort. 320 Describing a relationship as an agency or as a
single entity is a conclusory assertion which itself calls for a test. 321
By putting new wine in old bottles, courts which justify new directions with the terminology of the past perpetuate the confusion and
cacophony that characterizes this area of the law.
The legal concepts courts use to express their results also limit
the scope of the issues they consider. As Judge Cardozo observed,
"[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as
devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it." 322 The
landscape of personal jurisdiction over absent corporations has undergone vast changes since Cannon was decided. What were once
315. Griffin, supra note 54, passim.
316. E.g., In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 407 F. Supp. 1285, 1294-1300 (N.D. Ga.
1975); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. at 269-317; Sunrise
Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 55 F.R.D. 519, 524-26 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
317. See, e.g., O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 491 F.2d at 1066-67. Although
Griffin cites this case as an example of careful factual analysis, Griffin, supra note 54, at 395
n.94, this is disputed in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. at
319 n.30. See also l.S. Joseph Co. v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1023 (D.
Minn. 1976); United States ex rel. Martin-Trigona v. Bankamerica Corp., [1974-1] Trade
Cas. ~ 74,916 (D.D.C. 1974), dismissed for lack of standing sub nom. Martin-Trigona v.
Federal Reserve Bd., 509 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
The courts in the Southern District of New York may lean the other way, retaining
jurisdiction pending further discovery, see Meat Systems Corp. v. Ben Langen-Mol, Inc.,
[1976-1] Trade Cas. ~ 60,965, at 69,261 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
318. Griffin, supra note 54, at 381-83. See also Audio Warehouse Sales, Inc. v. U.S.
Pioneer Elecs. Corp., [1975-1] Trade Cas. ~ 60,213, at 65,832 (D.D.C.), vacated as moot, id.
~ 60,293 (D.D.C. 1975).
319. Wellborn, supra note 158, at 695-703.
320. Id. at 695; Griffin, supra note 54, at 383.
321. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 94-95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926); Ballantine,
supra note 161, at 14, 18; Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary
Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 195 (1929).
322. 244 N.Y. at 94, 155 N.E. at 61. See United States v. Scophony Corp. of America,
333 U.S. at 818-20 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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thought to be insurmountable natural barriers are now crossed easily. The narrow and technical issue of the corporate shareholder's
liability to suit, however, remains locked in the language of the past.
The terms courts use today are similar to those used fifty years
ago. 323 Cannon, in essence, combined the substantial showing required to pierce the corporate veil with the strong showing needed,
at that time, to establish that an out-of-state corporation was doing
business locally. 324 The result was a prohibitively stringent standard.325
The Cannon rule has survived because courts continue to confuse substantive and jurisdictional liability .326 Lip service is paid to
the distinction, but the terminology used in the two types of holdings is virtually indistinguishable. 327 The important functional distinctions between the two contexts are ignored. 328 "Piercing the corporate veil" is a creditor's remedy and is essentially a penalty for
abuse of the statutory privilege of limited liability. 329 Subjecting the
foreign parent to jurisdiction where a subsidiary is present serves
the different purpose of requiring the parent to defend claims in
forums where it receives economic benefits.
An extreme example of the application of the Cannon rule is the
recent antitrust case, Williams v. Canon, Inc. 330 Plaintiff Williams
started out as a consultant to Canon U.S.A., Inc. (Canon U.S.A.)
and eventually became the exclusive independent dealer for Canon
calculators in the western United States. Canon U.S.A. was the
wholly-owned subsidiary of Canon, Inc., a Japanese manufacturer.331 Williams's territory was gradually reduced, and his contract
was finally terminated. Canon U.S.A. preferred dealing with its
323. See H. BALLANTINE, supra note 158, § 140; Ballantine, supra note 161, passim.
324. F. POWELL, supra note 284, at 140-50.
325. Id. at 151. See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. at 336-37.
326. See Wellborn, supra note 158, at 685-88. See also Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp.,
391 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md. 1975) (the opinion repeatedly uses the phrase "pierce the corporate
veil," a term which primarily refers to substantive liability cases); Audio Warehouse Sales,
Inc. v. U.S . Pioneer Elecs. Corp., [1975-1] Trade Cas. ~ 60,213, at 60,831 (D.D.C.), vacated
as moot, id. ~ 60,293 (D.D.C . 1975).
327. Compare Ballantine, supra note 161, passim, with Douglas & Shanks, supra note
286, passim.
328. Wellborn, supra note 158, at 685, 686.
329. See generally w. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 109-49 (4th ed.
unabr. 1969).
330. 432 F. Supp. 376 (C.D . Cal. 1977).
331. The corporate relationships were straightforward: Canon, Inc. owned 100% of Canon
U.S.A., Inc ., which in turn owned 100% of both Astra Office Products, Inc. and Canon
Business Machines, Inc. Id. at 378 n.1.
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wholly-owned subsidiary, Astro Business Machines, Inc. (Astro).
Williams also alleged that prior to his termination Canon U.S.A.
sold its calculators to Astro at cheaper prices than he was charged,
there by undermining his dealership.
Relying on Toshiba America, the court found it lacked jurisdiction over Canon, Inc. in the California forum. 332 Two men served on
the boards of all three companies. Takeshi Mitari was also the chairman of the board of Canon, Inc.; Seiichi Takikawa was also the
chairman of the board of Astro and the president of Canon U.S.A.
Takikawa was later made president of Astro at a board meeting of
Canon, Inc. The court held that these relationships were immaterial
because it found that when Mitari and Takikawa promoted Canon
products in the United States they acted for the subsidiaries. The
court held that the basic policy decisions of the subsidiaries, as to
pricing and opening U.S. branch offices, came from Japan only
because both men lived there. The court held that personnel of the
parent operating training schools for subsidiary employees in California were not "transacting business." The parent owned twentythree trademarks exploited by the subsidiaries throughout the
United States. Securities of the parent were marketed throughout
the United States. A domestic joint venture between the parent and
a U.S. motion picture concern was held immaterial because the
technical assistance and licensing agreements provided for Japanese
arbitration. Judge Takasugi concluded that the facts were insufficient "to warrant this court's piercing of the corporate veil." 333

E.

Solutions

Distorted results are produced by the failure to adequately distinguish general from long-arm jurisdiction. Applying either state
long-arm statutes or International Shoe should lead to the conclusion that an alien corporation which uses a domestic subsidiary to
distribute goods will generally be subject to personal jurisdiction in
an antitrust case. The key issue is: What is the nature of the
violation? Whether foreign manufacturers are permitted to exploit
U.S. markets and yet remain immune from antitrust enforcement
should not turn on questions of corporate structure.
The rule of International Shoe and its progeny is that where a
corporation's minimal intrusions into a forum for its own benefit are
332. Id. at 379-82.
333. Id. at 380.
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related to the cause of action, the due process clause permits that
forum to subject the corporation to personal jurisdiction. 334 The
long-arm statutes of nearly all states expressly codify this formula. 335
They typically list a series of types of conduct on which jurisdiction
may be based, with the explicit caveat: "When jurisdiction over a
person is based solely upon this section, only a [cause of action]
[claim for relief] arising from acts enumerated in this section may
be asserted against him." 336 The antitrust laws redress economic
injuries resulting from violations of laws designed to ensure free
trade. 337 The Alcoa test requires both a violation and a foreseen
domestic impact for the U.S. federal courts to take subject matter
jurisdiction. 338 Personal jurisdiction may be based on either
"presence" or long-arm contacts. Where the substantive law being
applied prohibits shipping goods, or causing goods to be shipped,
into the United States in restraint of trade, 339 the minimum contacts
logically required should be the presence in the United States of a
distributing arm of the violator, or the presence of an entity capable
of maintaining or continuing the violation.
Remarkably, the cases hold that a domestic subsidiary must be
controlled by, the agent of, or the same as its parent for the parent
to be liable. If the subsidiary maintains its independence-which
presumably includes managing its own affairs, having a different
name, having its own directors and officers, and setting its own
marketing and pricing policies-the parent will be immune. 340 This
will be so, for example, even if the parent distributes widgets only
334. See notes 100-21 supra and accompanying text.
335. Those that do not, incorporate it implicitly. E.g., CAL. C1v. PROC. CODE § 410.10
(West 1973) ("A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent
with the Constitution of this state or of the United States."). See generally Gorfinkel &
Lavine, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in California Under New Section 410.10 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1163 (1970).
336. UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03(b). Accord, Civil
Practice Act § 17, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968); N.Y. C1v. PRAC. LAW§
302(a) (McKinney 1972) (quoted in part at note 119 supra). See generally Currie, The Growth
of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533.
337. See notes 56-64 supra and accompanying text.
338. See notes 80-84 supra and accompanying text.
339. Of course, U.S . trade may also be restrained by nonimporters. An agreement by an
alien company with an importer or a domestic producer not to ship into the U.S. could have
substantial U .S. effects. See P. AREEDA, supra note 53, at 63; W. FUGATE, supra note 65, at
87.
340. An even more insidious problem is raised by Illinois Brick Co . v. Illinois, 431 U.S .
720 (1977). In treble damage suits alleging price-fixing or tying arrangements, only the
"independent" subsidiary, not the injured consumer (the "indirect purchaser"), would have
standing to sue. See id. at 736 n.16.
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through its U.S. subsidiary, is the sole source of U.S. widgets, and
is a member of an infamous widget cartel whose agreement providing for quotas, minimum prices, and world-wide territorial allocations is inscribed in twelve-inch roman capitals on the side of a
mountain. The cases hold that owning a U.S. distributor, without
more, is not a minimum contact. 341
Approaching the jurisdictional problem as one of control or
agency would be justified if the cause of action were unrelated to
the presence of the local subsidiary. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. 342 established that International Shoe left intact
prior case law in situations where the defendant corporation could
be said to be present. 342 · 5 Perkins held that if a defendant was engaged in "systematic and continuous corporate activities" 343 the due
process clause did not forbid subjecting it to in personam jurisdiction on a cause of action unrelated to its activities. 344 This basis for
jurisdiction is similar to the old tests for "doing business." 345 The
agency standard comes down to us from those pre-modern times,
and it is appropriate in two general types of cases: first, where the
parent is alleged to be responsible for some act of the subsidiary; 346
second, where the cause of action against the parent is unrelated to
the forum activity of the subsidiary. 347 In the first situation, the
341. It is what constitutes "more" that is the subject of considerable debate. Courts are
not insensitive to the strong public policies behind antitrust enforcement, and this factor has
contributed to erosion of the Cannon doctrine. See United States v. Scophony Corp. of
America, 333 U.S. at 817; Fugate, An Overview of Antitrust Enforcement and the Multinational Corporation, 8 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 1, 1 (1973). See also Griffin, supra note 54, at 38889.
342. 342 U.S. 437, 446-47 (1952).
342.5 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1945); Comment,
International Shoe and Long-Arm Jurisdiction-How About Pennsylvania?, 8 DuQ. L. REV.
319, 322-23 (1970).
343. 342 U.S. at 445.
344. Id. at 446-48.
345. See Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 539, 227 N.E.2d
851, 855-58, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 46 (Breitel, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967).
See generally Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 93032 (1960); Note, Jurisdictioh Over Foreign Corporations-An Analysis of Due Process, 104 U.
PA. L. REV. 381, 397-99 (1955).
346. This situation can arise in either of two contexts: jurisdictional (can the parent be
sued?) or substantive (can the parent be made to pay?).
347. It is important to recognize that Cannon falls squarely within this category. As a
general rule in all situations the case is useless; limited to its facts, the result is valid today.
The lower court reported:
The transactions out of which the alleged breach of contract in the present case
grew had no relation to any activity of the Alabama [subsidiary] corporation. The
alleged contract was made solely with the packing company, the Maine [parent]
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control exerted by the parent is an essential element of its liability;
in the second, unless the subsidiary is the agent of its parent, or the
two are held to be a single entity, the parent has no local contacts.
Many of the foreign antitrust cases considered in this Comment
involve the following pattern: the alien parent did something illegal
and its subsidiary sold the goods here. 348 An analysis based on
International Shoe should ask, What is the purpose of the
subsidiary? The question is whether a cartel or monopoly has invaded our markets. 349 Regardless of the degree of control, if the
function of the subsidiary is to permit the parent to avail itself of
the benefits and privileges of U.S. markets, 350 then that subsidiary
itself constitutes a substantial economic intrusion into a forum.
That activity alone should be held to be a minimum contact upon
which to base jurisdiction over the parent for violations of the antitrust laws.
Focusing on the relation between the function of the subsidiary
and the substantive allegations against the parent, rather than on
the degree of control or domination, will not necessarily expand or
contract jurisdiction. It will make jurisdiction more appropriate.
International Shoe emphasized the kind of contacts with the forum,
not the amount. 351 If the local business of the subsidiary is unrelated
to the product line or the services that are the subject matter of the
complaint against the parent, long-arm jurisdiction should ordinarcorporation, and related to the manufacture of cotton sheetings for use in its meat
packing business; and the Alabama corporation, as such, is in no way concerned with
the merits of the controversy.
The counsel for both plaintiff and defendant agreed that the issue to be passed
upon by the court is solely whether there is such an identity between the Alabama
corporation and the Maine corporation as that the Maine corporation was present
and doing business in North Carolina . . . .
Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 292 F. 169, 170-71 (W.D.N.C. 1923). Scophony's
distinguishing Cannon as a "manufacturing and selling case" makes little or no sense jurisdictionally. See notes 168-71 supra and accompanying text.
348. E.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 244, 246, 402
F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838, 847-48 (S.D. Fla.
1975).
This characterization is, of course, an oversimplication; its point is to sharpen and
distinguish issues. It would be more accurate to add that conspiracy between the defendant
affiliates is also alleged in nearly all these cases. E.g., Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk
A.G., (1975-1] Trade Cas. ~ 60,308 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
349. See Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659, 66667 (D.N.H. 1977).
350. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
351. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
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ily be unavailable. 352 Similarly, long-arm is inappropriate when the
subsidiary's acts are the basis of the complaint, unless those acts are
directed by the parent. 353 The presence of a wholly-owned subsidiary
is relevant to long-arm jurisdiction when it is the conduit through
which the parent violates U.S. law. 354
Since 1911 antitrust cases have consistently applied American
law to acts performed abroad, 355 and jurisdiction has regularly been
asserted over foreign affiliates of domestic corporations. 356 The early
cases struggled to base both subject matter and personal jurisdiction upon some domestic activity. 357 The separateness of foreign
legal entities rarely presented a problem because the substantive
allegations usually concerned monopolistic corporate acquisitions or
combinations. 358 In one type of case, the jurisdictional allegation was
that the conspiratorial or monopolistic acts affecting commerce had
occurred in the United States. 359 In the other common type of case,
352. Loose single-entity analysis can bring as many inappropriate cases into courts as
strict agency standards can eliminate proper defendants. See Frummer v. Hilton Hotels
Internat'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 539, 227 N.E.2d 851, 855, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 45 (Breitel, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967). Cf. Handlos v. Litton Indus., Inc., 304 F. Supp.
347 (E .D. Wis. 1969) (jurisdiction over parent upheld where plaintiff sued subsidiary shipbuilder for negligent manufacture; sister finance subsidiary shown doing business in the
forum; agency language used but single entity purportedly shown).
353. See, e.g., Williams v. Canon, Inc., in which it is clear that the plaintiffs complaint,
aside from alleging conspiracy, charges the subsidiary, Canon U.S.A., with the wrongful
conduct, 432 F. Supp. 376, 378 (C.D. Cal. 1977) . Unfortunately Toshiba America, upon which
the court in Williams relied, does not set forth the plaintiffs allegations with any more
specificity than "antitrust action." 491 F.2d at 1065.
354. Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. at 842, 846-50. See generally Wells Fargo &
Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 419-22 (9th Cir. 1977).
355. See notes 73-75 supra and accompanying text.
356. See generally 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 118-51 (1968) (nearly
every case cited as illustrating the principles of extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction subjects
an alien parent or subsidiary to personal jurisdiction); THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL
COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT 66-77 (1955); Oseas, Antitrust Prosecutions
of International Business, 30 CORNELL L.Q. 42 (1944).
357. K. BREWSTER, supra note 65, at 70-74; SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW OF THE ABA,
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 356 (1975); Oseas, supra note 356, at 44-45, 53-58; Note,
Extraterritorial Application of United States Law: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 1005, 1017 (1976).
358. See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221U.S.106, 171-72 (1911). But
cf. United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1929)
(different result where the French government, as majority stockholder of one of the defendants, claimed sovereign immunity).
The defendant company being an entity distinct from its stockholders, immunity cannot be claimed by it or on its behalf on the ground that it and the government
of France are identical in any respect.
Id.
359. See United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 273-76 (1927); United States
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some essential act of the violation was carried out here. 360 Because
sales are an essential element in any business, 361 modern cases involving subsidiary distributors are akin to this second variation. 362
An early case in which jurisdiction was based solely on the
presence of a subsidiary doing business locally is Dobson v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co. 363 In Dobson, jurisdiction in personam over
the German parent company, through service upon an officer of its
domestic subsidiary, was upheld on the ground that the sole purpose
for incorporating the American subsidiary was to market dyestuffs
in the United States pursuant to an illegal cartel agreement. The
subsidiary was held to be the agent and the "corporate creature" 364
of its alien parent, but there was no real showing of domination and
control. Personal jurisdiction was based on mere ownership of the
subsidiary. The crux of the logic of the case, far ahead of its time,
was that the formation of the subsidiary constituted an attempt to
avoid the consequences of the Sherman Act. 365 Dobson also illustrates the reason for assuming jurisdiction over alien parent corporations in many antitrust cases. The subsidiary may be doing nothing wrong. A New York corporation buying dyestuffs abroad and
selling them in Pennsylvania does not necessarily violate the antitrust laws; a foreign cartel operating in the United States does.
Today's results bear out this analysis. The modern cases make
sense if viewed as incorporating the Dobson rationale. Cases using
the "control" approach stay well within the terminology of traditional case law. 366 Occasionally, however, the requisite "control" is
minimal. This can always be justified by comparing a case to
v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Nav. Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106 (1913); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 145-46, 171-72 (1911).
360. See Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917); United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, Equity No. 41-124 (S .D.N.Y. 1929) (unreported, summarized in Oseas,
supra note 356, at 47-48 & nn.20-21), 31F.2d199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). See also United States v.
Nord Deutscher Lloyd, 223 U.S. 512, 517-18 (1912); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische
P.F.A.G., 200 F. 806, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), 216 F. 971(S.D.N.Y.1914), reu'd on other grounds,
239 U.S. 466 (1916).
361. Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. at 843-45; Sudbury Wire Rope Mfg. Co. v.
United States Steel Corp., 129 F. Supp. 425, 427 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
362. Many recent cases demonstrate that courts continue to search for direct contacts
by the parent into the forum to bolster jurisdictional claims. See, e.g., United States v.
Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. at 815-16; Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. at 271, 274, 277-78, 282-88, 290-317.
363. 206 F. 125 (E.D. Pa. 1913).
364. Id. at 128.
365. Id.
366. See notes 294-300 supra and accompanying text.
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Scophony, where Limited's control over SCA was subject to the veto
of the other American shareholders. 367 On such a slim showing there
is no true agency, and the cases can only be understood as examples
of long-arm jurisdiction. 368 Phrasing the test as "control those decisions which might involve violation of the antitrust laws" 369 misses
the point where the parent's acts, not the subsidiary's, are at
issue. 370 Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk A.G. 371 lists as
"indicia of corporate control": (1) personnel of the subsidiary had
been trained while employed by the parent; (2) the parent and
subsidiary worked together to coordinate product design changes;
(3) the parent tested the subsidiary's product which (4) carried the
parent's brand name; (5) marketing information was exchanged regularly. 372 These elements do not demonstrate control by the parent;
independent contracting parties do all of these things. The facts
show a high degree of involvement. They show that the parent has
purposely availed itself of the benefits of the forum as a marketplace.
Cases basing jurisdiction upon a showing of section 12 venue 373
make sense if "transacting business" can be shown to be an appropriate minimum contact. This result is asserted more often than it
is explained. 374 Generally, jurisdiction may not be based on venue. 375
367. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. at 800. See Hitt v. Nissan
Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. at 841-42; Flank Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 357,
364-65 (D. Colo. 1967).
368. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d at 419-20.
369. Flank Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. at 365; adopted in Hitt v. Nissan
Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. at 842 & n.10.
370. Unfortunately, the substantive allegations were not discussed in Flank Oil, 277 F.
Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1957). See also cases cited note 353 supra. Compare Flank Oil with
Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123, 126, 130, 134 (D.N.H. 1975)
and Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367, 369, 371 (D. Md. 1975). Both Grappone
and Call Carl specifically relate the Flank Oil test to allegations that the parent was responsible for the subsidiary injuring the plaintiff.
371. [1975-1] Trade Cas. ~ 60,308 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
372. Id. at 66,213-14. See Audio Warehouse Sales, Inc. v. U.S. Pioneer Elecs. Corp.,
[1975-ll Trade Cas. ~ 60,213, at 65,832-33 (D.D.C.), vacated as moot, id. ~ 60,293 (D.D.C.
1975).
373. See notes 205-20 supra and accompanying text.
374. See United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. at 810, 818; Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. at 317, 328-29, 330; Audio Warehouse
Sales, Inc. v. U.S. Pioneer Elecs. Corp., [1975-1] Trade Cas. at 65,833; Hoffman Motors
Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Note that because section
12 authorizes nationwide service, venue will, in effect, support jurisdiction in a wholly domestic case. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 373-74 (1927);
Frederick Cinema Corp. v. Interstate Theatres Corp., 413 F. Supp. 840, 841 n.1(D.D.C.1976).
375. See Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 224-25 (D.N.J.
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That the plaintiff has selected a proper forum does not automatically subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction. In the context of
section 12 of the Clayton Act, however, the "transacts business" test
is the ''everyday business or commercial concept of doing or carrying
on business 'of any substantial character . . . . ' " 376 Because antitrust actions allege various unfair trade practices, it may be asked
whether the business conducted is a sufficient minimum contact. If
the cause of action arises out of the business transacted in the
forum, then long-arm jurisdiction is appropriate. Trade conducted
by a surrogate subsidiary for the benefit of the parent does not make
the analysis less correct.
The single-entity cases also make more sense from the point of
view of International Shoe than as cases where the parent has blatantly disregarded corporate separations. 377 The actual management
structures of the modern multinational corporations take on widely
varying forms. 378 The range of different degrees of delegation and
autonomy or centralized control is beyond the scope of this writing.
Within some areas of operations, local management may both control day-to-day affairs and have ultimate responsibility; within others, the parent-shareholder may control either minutiae or broad
policy directions. 379 Asking precise jurisdictional questions limits
the extent to which a plaintiff must discover and a court must
confront intricate questions of structure and control. If the substantive allegations relate to acts of the parent, dumping or cartelization
for example, the function of the subsidiary as a distributor should
subject the parent to jurisdiction wherever the subsidiary markets
the offending products.
1966); 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 4.02(4] (2d ed. 1967 & 1975); 1 id. ~~ .140(1.-2],
.140(3] (2d ed. 1974); cases cited note 264 supra.
376. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. at 807. See notes 126-32 supra
and accompanying text.
377 . See notes 291-93 supra and accompanying text.
378. See generally Steinbock-Sinclair v. Amoco Int'l Oil Co., 401 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Ill.
1975); Golbert & Wilson, Centralizing the International Operations of Multinationals, 11 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 70 (1973); Griffin, supra note 54, at 378-83 and materials cited; Hadari, The
Structure of the Private Multinational Enterprise, 71 MICH. L. REv. 731 (1973); Rubin, The
International Firm and the National Jurisdiction, in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 179 (P.
Kindleberger ed. 1970); Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739 (1970).
379. Griffin, supra note 54, at 380 & n.32. See generally Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of
America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123, 132 n.3 (D.N.H. 1975); K.J. Schwartzbaum, Inc. v. Evans,
Inc., 44 F.R.D. 589, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Intermountain Ford Tractor Sales Co. v. MasseyFerguson Ltd., 210 F. Supp. 930, 934-38 & nn .5-8 (D . Utah 1962), aff'd per curiam, 325 F.2d
713 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S . 931 (1964).
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One formula incorporating this idea has been used repeatedly
in cases decided in the Southern District of New York. 380 In such
cases the parent will be subject to jurisdiction where it "has wholly
owned subsidiaries performing services in the local jurisdiction
which ordinarily would be performed by service employees." 381 This
standard was first applied in a domestic antitrust venue challenge
where the court's analysis of the "transacts business" requirement
was analogous to a minimum contacts approach. 382 The court
stressed that the parent, not its subsidiaries, was the defendant. 383
The emphasis of the test is the same as the holding in Dobson. The
out-of-state or alien parent cannot evade jurisdiction where its subsidiary performs acts for the parent's benefit which would subject
the parent to liability had it done them itself. 384
The long-arm analysis proposed here explains results. 385 Since
1960, thirteen antitrust cases have litigated the issue of whether an
alien parent corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction in a
forum where its subsidiary does some amount of business. 386 Jurisdiction has been upheld in nine cases, and denied in four cases in
which the court applied restrictive theory. Ignoring theory reveals
patterns of consistency. Four cases do not discuss the character of
the substantive harm. 387 However, jurisdiction was successfully as380. See note 384 infra.
381. Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 149 F. Supp. 830, 835 (S.D .N.Y. 1957). Another
version of this test is set forth in text at note 254 supra. See also Dobson v. Farbenfabriken
of Elberfeld Co., 206 F. 125, 128 (E.D. Pa. 1913).
382. 149 F. Supp. at 834-37.
383. Id. at 834.
384. Unfortunately, the New York Court of Appeals expanded this test, in Frummer v.
Hilton Hotels International, Inc., to a finding of general agency, expressly applying it in a
situation where there was admittedly no long-arm jurisdiction. See notes 302-09 supra and
accompanying text. The court unanimously agreed that making reservations, the act in New
York, had nothing to do with the negligent management of the London hotel where the
plaintiff was injured. 19 N.Y.2d at 536, 539, 227 N.E.2d at 853, 855, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 43, 46.
Frum mer has blurred analysis of the difference between general and long-arm jurisdiction in
subsequent antitrust cases applying New York jurisdictional law. See Meat Systems Corp.
v. Ben Langen-Mol, Inc., [1976-1] Trade Cas. ~ 60,965, at 69,200 (S .D.N .Y. 1976); Martin
Motor Sales, Inc. v. Saab-Scania of America, Inc., [1974-2] Trade Cas. ~ 75,196, at 97,389
(S.D.N .Y. 1974) (action brought under Automobile Dealer Franchise Act; Frummer cited as
an example of long-arm jurisdiction); Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 55 F.R.D.
519, 528-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (general jurisdiction where "Japanese parents have created
wholly-owned subsidiaries solely to serve their interests"); Tokyo Boeki (U.S.A.) Inc. v. SS
Navarino, 324 F. Supp. 361, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
385. See generally, Llewelyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 431 (1930).
386. Cases cited notes 387-89 infra.
387. O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 491F.2d1064 (9th Cir. 1974); Meat Systems

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol5/iss1/6

56

Kingery: Jurisdiction in Antitrust

1977]

Jurisdiction in Antitrust

205

serted in six out of the seven cases where the parent's acts were
alleged to have harmed the plaintiff. 388 On the other hand, where the
subsidiary harmed the plaintiff, jurisdiction over the parent was
successfully challenged in two out of three cases. 389 Although all the
cases required some degree of "control" by the parent to support
jurisdiction, the absence of sufficient control was a bar only where
the subsidiary, not the parent, had been the major actor.
V.

CONCLUSION

The need for adequate guidelines is clear. 390 The chief difficulty
courts have faced in deciding questions of personal jurisdiction over
alien parent companies has been the confusion in the case law. To
foreign countries, and alien shareholders and management, inadequate standards which produce apparently arbitrary results cannot
seem much like "fair play and substantial justice." California
should not be the only state in which a Japanese manufacturing
parent cannot be sued for alleged antitrust violations. 391
Corp. v. Ben Langen-Mo}, Inc., [1976-1] Trade Cas. ~ 60,965 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Heatransfer
Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., [1975-1] Trade Cas. ~ 60,308 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Sunrise
Toyota Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 55 F.R.D. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
388. Jurisdiction upheld: Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F.
Supp. at 328-30; Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. at 848-49; Dobbins v. Kawasaki
Motors Corp., [1974-1] Trade Cas. ~ 75,100 (D. Ore. 1974); Intermountain Ford Tractor
Sales Co. v. Massey-Ferguson Ltd., 210 F. Supp. 930, 931, 939 (D. Utah 1962) (agency found),
aff'd, 325 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964); Hoffman Motors Corp.
v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70, 74-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Jurisdiction denied: LS. Joseph
Co. v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1023, 1024 (D. Minn. 1976) (subsidiary
not shown to be transacting business in district).
389. Jurisdiction denied: Williams v. Canon, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 376, 378 (C.D. Cal. 1977);
Norman's on the Waterfront v. West Indies Corp., Civ. No. 515/1973 (D.V.I. July 17, 1974).
Jurisdiction upheld: Audio Warehouse Sales, Inc. v. U.S. Pioneer Elecs. Corp., [1975-1]
Trade Cas. ~ 60,213 (D.D.C. 1975) (facts at id. ~ 60,282 (injunctive relief)), vacated as moot,
id. ~ 60,293 (D.D .C. 1975).
390. With much fanfare, the Justice Department this year published its Antitrust Guide
for International Operations. Its purpose was to provide counsel with a working statement of
government enforcement policy. Personal jurisdiction, however, is mentioned only twice. The
Guide states that "[ t]he Department will . . . seek to exercise the fullest permissible jurisdiction," utilizing modern trends of expanded personal jurisdiction. INTERNATIONAL AN'11TRUST
GUIDE, supra note 234, reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799, at E-3 &
n.20, TRADE REG. REPORTS (CCH) No. 266, pt. II, at 8 & n.20. The Guide later states, without
support, that the foreign subsidiary of a U.S . multinational is clearly subject to personal
jurisdiction because the parent is doing business in the U.S. Id., reprinted in ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799, at E-15, TRADE REG. REPORTS (CCH) No. 266, pt. II, at 5253.
391. Compare O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 491F.2d1064 (9th Cir. 1974) and
Williams v. Canon, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1977) with Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. 1975) and Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co.,
399 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
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Whether or not the antitrust laws should or do operate abroad
is not within the scope of this writing. The courts have consistently
held that the Sherman Act prohibits foreign cartels and monopolies
from marketing their products in the United States. A corporation
whose clear intent is to exploit the American marketplace should
not be permitted to insulate itself from the legal requirements of
doing business here by incorporating a domestic subsidiary. Misapplied, technical rules of corporate law should not frustrate congressional policies. To arrive at a straightforward approach, the issues
and concepts which in the past have only produced confusion should
be discarded. 392
The rule of Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing
Co. 393 should be abandoned. Cannon was a case of federal common
law that incorporated pre-International Shoe standards for corporate presence. Cannon is irrelevant to the reach of modern state
long-arm statutes. As an antiquated technical rule that is riddled
with qualifications and exceptions, the case no longer helps answer
legal questions.
The Clayton Act corporate venue provision 394 should be ignored
when an alien is sued. First, venue is never a bar because "[a]n
alien may be sued in any district. " 395 Second, whatever "transacts
business" means, section 12 venue is as broad or broader than personal jurisdiction. Wherever the court has personal jurisdiction over
a corporate defendant in antitrust, venue is proper. Unless the court
has jurisdiction, venue or anything else is irrelevant.
Any modern analysis of personal jurisdiction must start with
International Shoe. 396 Acts done abroad may violate the antitrust
laws if their purpose or foreseeable result is to affect U.S. commerce.
If the purpose of a domestic subsidiary is to promote and distribute
products which its parent produced or priced in violation of the
Sherman Act, then state long-arm statutes can subject the parent
to personal jurisdiction. The cause of action arises out of acts done
in the forum. The act done in the forum is the ownership of a local
outlet for the offending products.
William D. Kingery, Jr.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.

See generally T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
267 U.S. 333 (1925).
Clayton Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1970).
28 u.s.c. § 1391(d) (1970).
See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 206-12 (1977).
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